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Notes on transliteration 
In transliterating the names of persons, titles or geographical areas I have mainly 
followed the British practice of spelling words in Arabic. Still, many of the central names 
found in the source material are spelled differently according to writer. I have chosen to 
use the names that are most common, which means that some names might deviate from 
the classic British transliteration. For example is the writing of the name Humr with a “u” 
inconsistent with the general rule of writing names with an “o”. As a general rule 
however “o”, “g” and “i” substitute “u”, “q” and “y”, resulting in words such as Umda, 
Baqqara  and Messiriya  being transcribed as Omda, Baggara and Messiria. It can also be 
noted that the British also used the letter “g” for the Arabic “j” (jim), which explains why 
I have spelled the name Agaira with a “g” and not written Ajaira like it is pronounced.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Baggara, Messiria and Humr 
The Arab nomads of the Sudan are divided into two different groups; camelmen and 
cattlemen. While the camelmen live on the southern semi-desert fringes of the Sahara, 
cattlemen, called the Baggara, occupy the area even further south approaching the flood 
plains of the White Nile basin. With the semi-desert in the north being too dry, and the 
wet areas further south being to muddy and having many flies, the Baggara inhabits the 
belt in between where the environmental conditions makes it suitable to keep cattle. This 
area has the capacity to support enough cattle for the Baggara to be self sufficient. The 
Humr, together with the Zurug Messiria, the Rizeygat, and the Hawazma form a block of 
Baggara which inhabit the southern regions of Kordofan and the south-eastern areas of 
Darfur. These four tribes are known as ‘Ataya, but do not form any political unit of any 
kind. The Messiria live in the south-western corner of the Kordofan province.  
 
The Humr and the Zurug were regarded as two segments that had grown apart as a result 
of tribal evolution. After previously forming one Messiria tribe they became separated 
throughout the first half of the 19th century establishing two distinct tribes. Hence, the 
Humr did not regard themselves as Messiria on account of their many differences and 
conflicts with the Zurug, and were known only as Humr. The name Messiria was 
therefore often used with reference to the Zurug alone. However the term Messiria was 
also used to refer to the Humr and the Zurug as a unified group. In order to make less 
confusing I have chosen to distinguish between the two segments by using the names 
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The modern history of the Sudan is marked with changing regimes and shifts which 
naturally also has affected the Sudanese people. The Anglo-Egyptian presence in the 
Sudan lasting from 1898 to 1956, and the colonial policies regarding the different groups 
of the Sudanese society laid the foundation for the country’s further development in 
modern times. During this period an administrative reform was introduced which 
influenced the population in the less central regions of the country and had a significant 
impact on the tribal societies. This new form of local administration was referred to as 
Native Administration and it is the study of the implementation and effects of this reform 
that form the basis of this thesis. 
 
Definitions 
The term “tribe” can have different meanings and limitations. A common definition is 
that the word tribe refers to a group of individuals tied together by kinship through 
mutual decent or marriage.3 This refers to flexible units that change in accordance with 
inner dynamics and external pressure. The definition of a tribe can however vary 
according to the purpose of its use and who was defining it. A Sudanese can also regard 
his tribal affiliation differently according to the situation and how far he is from his tribal 
homeland. The sources show that the Sudanese and the British perception of a tribe could 
diverge. The British understanding of what determined a tribe is central to this thesis 
because of its significance regarding the introduction of Native Administration. This 
theme will be further discussed in chapter 3.  
 
It is also important to specify what is meant with the term Native Administration, which 
was also referred to as “devolution” and in the 1930s went on to being called “indirect 
rule”. Native Administration was based on Fredric Lugard’s ideas of a practical form of 
administration and control which intended to provide the local government with the 
freedom to take care of its own affairs lead by their own leaders.4 The local leadership 
was never the less to be controlled by British government officials and the rules and 
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regulations set by the central power. In my thesis I have chosen to use the term Native 
Administration and not indirect rule  
 
Problem and method 
The question which I seek to answer in this thesis is: What were the consequences of the 
Anglo-Egyptian regime’s introduction of Native Administration in the early 20th century 
for the Humr Baggara in western Kordofan? I have chosen to mainly focus on the Humr 
tribe on account of it being a significant group of the Baggara living in southern 
Kordofan that has yet to be studied in light of this administrative reform. The Humr can 
be further divided into two primary segments, called the Agaira and the Felaita. Because 
of my source situation I have mainly directed my attention towards the Agaira, and will 
sometimes study this section more closely. The history of the Humr tribe, and its 
development of a strong leadership in the Anglo-Egyptian period, also makes it 
interesting to look at the government’s influence on the tribal organization. Did the 
changes that followed with the introduction of Native Administration have any impact on 





















In order to answer the above questions, it is useful to compare the impact on the Humr 
tribe with previous studies on what effects Native Administration had on other Kordofan 
tribes. The Bideiriya tribe of central Kordofan and the Kababish camel nomads living in 
the north has previously been viewed in light of the changes that followed with the 
introduction of a new local administration in the Anglo-Egyptian period, and its impact 
on the division of power among the tribal members. 5 Both tribes have been studied in 
light of different analytical models in order to be able to understand the process of change 
and in what way the external influence had an effect on the internal tribal structures. 
While Ahmed Abu Shouk has focused on using the patron-client model in his study of 
the Bideiriya, Talal Asad has used an elitist model to analyse the Kababish tribe. 
 
Prior work done among the Humr tribe is generally quite scarce with the research done 
by anthropologist Ian Cunnison in the 1950s standing out as the most significant.6 This 
study views the Humr in light of the agnatic-segmentary model.  A significant aspect of 
this thesis will be to evaluate the agnatic-segmentary model opposed to the patron-client 
and the elitist models. To what extent are these models optimal tools in order to fully 
understand the political structures of the Humr society? And can one of the models give a 
more accurate understanding of how the introduction of Native Administration affected 
the Humr, and whether or not it can be said to have lead to any socio-political changes 
within the tribal society?   
 
For the purpose of limiting the focus of this study I have chosen not to elaborate greatly 
on the further development within the local administration after Native Administration 
had been introduced, nor its dissolution. I will also not go in to the subject of the 
Sudanese movement towards self rule which grew in the 1940s and 50s, or the political 
impact of this on local and national scale.  
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When I started the work on this study, my initial plan was to travel to Khartoum in order 
to search in the National Records Office (NRO) for material written on the Humr or the 
Messiria tribe. My hope was to find sources by British government officials who had 
stayed or worked in the Western Kordofan region in the early decades of the 20th century 
that had not yet been studied with regard to the introduction of Native Administration and 
hence could shed some new light on the developments that followed. However, because 
the NRO unexpectedly closed in order to move its collection right before my planned 
stay, I had to cancel the trip. In stead I went to Durham in Great Britain to look for 
sources that could be used for my purposes in the Sudan Archive Durham (SAD). This 
archive holds a large collection of papers written by members of the British 
administration, and others who served or lived in the Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian 
period. Still it lacks the papers of a few significant members of the Sudan Political 
Service which were stationed in Kordofan during the 1920s and 30s, like for example the 
collection of Sir John Maffey who worked as the governor-general from 1926-1933 
which are to be found at the NRO in Khartoum. 
 
The most important primary source that I was able to find in Durham was the writings of 
P. P. Howell from 1948.7 In addition I found some material regarding the Humr and the 
Messeria among the records of other British official such as K.D.D. Henderson, J. 
Robertson and A.C. Beaton. I have also searched the Sudan Notes and Records and have 
been able to find some relevant material here. Some travel tales have been written and 
published by British government officials who lived and worked in Kordofan in the 
relevant period, there does however not exist any such publication by a British member 
of the administration who stayed among the Messiria. 
 
Among the data regarding Sudan at the Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
(SMI) and the Mahmoud Salih collection in Bergen, unfortunately little can be found on 
the Messeria tribes of Western Kordofan. The exception is an interview of Babu Nimr 
done by Francis Deng in 1984. This interview is valuable since it is the only available 
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source material that describes the relationship between the leadership of the Humr tribe 
and the British rulers from a Sudanese point of view. A collection of the most important 
laws and regulations which created the framework for Native Administration found in 
Khartoum, El-Obeid, Durham and London was published by Bjørkelo and Abu Shouk in 
2004, and has also been one of the key sources in my work. 
 
The value of the sources must be estimated individually according to probable motive 
and situation. It is naturally a weakness that I depend mostly on material written by the 
British members of administration since lacking the views of the members of the Humr 
society may create an unbalanced perception of the reality. The interview of Babu Nimr 
is hence a welcomed exception which can help to create a more balanced analysis of the 
relation and power balance between the Sudanese members of Native Administration and 
the British colonial rulers. All in all the primary sources on the Humr tribe are rare, and 
without access to the records in Khartoum it is difficult to draw any very certain 
conclusions. The sources are nevertheless sufficient to give a general impression of the 
situation, but I am sure that a closer look at the NRO in Khartoum would give a more 
nuanced image of the introduction of Native Administration in Dar Humr. 
 
When it comes to secondary source material, the situation resembles the case of the 
primary material. Although it is possible to find written material on several Sudanese 
tribes with regard to their interactions with the British administration during the 20th 
century, little research has been done on the Baggara tribes in Western Kordofan. Ian 
Cunnison’s anthropological study of the Humr tribe from the mid 1950s is the only 
secondary source which focuses on the Humr tribe and can give some insight in the tribal 
society and political structures. Other studies done on other Sudanese tribes with regard 
to Native Administration has been useful in order to get an insight on how this 
administrative reorganization influenced the tribal societies in general, and has been very 
useful as comparative tools. The most important of these sources has been Ahmed Abu 
Shouk’s work on the Bideiriya tribe and Talal Asad’s study of the Kababish. Willy 
Pettersen’s master thesis on the introduction of Native Administration in Darfur can also 
be mentioned in this respect. 
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The publications of Harold MacMichael’s on the composition of tribes in both Kordofan 
and the Sudan in general, shed a light on the British government’s policy toward tribal 
societies. Other useful studies on how Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan affected the 
tribal societies in Kordofan can be found in publications by Stiansen and Kevane and 
Nicole Grandin. When it comes to works done on Sudanese history in general, there is 
more material to be found. 
 
Structure 
The thesis starts by viewing the historical background of the Humr tribe from entering the 
Sudan around 1770, up to the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation 1898. The next section 
evaluates the reason behind the shift towards Native Administration and how the new 
administrative policy was introduced. Chapter 3 focuses on the Humr tribe, its pastoral 
way of life, migration cycle and the importance of genealogical descent. In respect to this 
I try to address how the British rulers aimed to structure the tribal societies, and how they 
used these structures in order to ease the organization and government of the Sudanese 
population. 
 
Chapter four looks at how power was distributed among the Humr both before and after 
the Condominium rulers took over power in the Sudan. Here I also focus on how a 
member of the Humr tribe was able to obtain a position within tribal leadership, and 
whether or not he was able to remain in this position. The final two chapters seek to 
answer the questions asked in the beginning of my thesis, and analyse whether or not the 
administrative policies of the Anglo-Egyptian period influenced the structure of the Humr 
society or its political organization. In order to do this I will look at three different 
analytical models previously used to study other tribal societies within Kordofan, and try 
to evaluate if any of these models are more useful in order to understand the socio-




Chapter 2: Historical background; Western Kordofan 
 
18th century migrations and internal strife 
The Baggara nomads are estimated to have arrived in Western-Kordofan around 1765-
1775. At this point in time the Sudan was not a united country, but consisted of a few 
mighty sultanates which controlled different regions. After having first lived around the 
Bagirmi and Wadai8 sultanates in the west, the Baggara were forced to move eastwards 
and finally settled around the Muglad in Western Kordofan.9 
 
Throughout the history of the Messiria periods of fairly stable administration have been 
interrupted by internal strife which has created shifts in the power-balance. In the late 18th 
and early 19th century different Messiria factions were drawn into devastating wars over 
power within the tribe. The struggle over leading positions created conflicts on different 
levels of segmentation. Although the Humr gained control over the Muglad area, internal 
strife made the leadership unstable. However, during the 1860s and 70s internal peace 
was established as Faris Saluha obtained control within the Felaita, one of the two 
segments that together formed the Humr tribe, and Ali Messar securing the leadership 
among the other segment, the Agaira.10 
 
From Turco-Egyptian to Mahdist rule 
In 1821 the Sudan was invaded by Ottoman Egypt forces, who overthrew the previously 
powerful sultanate of Sinnar which had existed since the 16th century. Kordofan was 
conquered the next year by Muhammad Bey Khusraw11, also known as the Daftardar, 
who founded the administrative structure of the province making El-Obeid the 
headquarters. The new rulers brought with them an extensive bureaucracy and formed a 
new Sudanese administration based on an Egyptian model. The central government was 
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placed in Khartoum, while local government was structured to operate on three different 
levels. 12  Firstly the country was divided into provinces, or mudiriyas. Provincial 
governors entitled mudirs were chosen by Cairo to preside over the provinces, supervised 
by a hikimdar, translated as Governor-general.13  The provinces were further divided into 
districts, and sub-districts, lead by a kashif, and a hakim or a nazir el-khatt.  
 
Although a new form of rule was established, the Turco-Egyptian administrators did not 
try to eradicate the tribal system or tribal loyalties.14 Previous territorial divisions within 
the sultanate of Sinnar had often followed tribal lines in both sedentary and pastoral 
societies, and each tribal group had been assigned its own dar.15 Tribal sheikhs were 
made to pay tribute to the sultan, and powerful positions had been reserved to members 
of certain families who had attained a prominent position. After the Turco-Egyptian 
takeover many sheikhs, or “nobles”, were confirmed in their positions as agents of the 
foreign government, and were given duties such as to collect tribute and the liberty to 
administer their own affairs without being greatly bothered by the central government. A 
large part of the old system hence survived with the new administration, even though a 
permanent body of local representatives as consultants to Turkish rulers was not 
established.16 One claim has been that the Turco-Egyptian colonial regime did not intend 
to establish an administration in the district, but practiced a “divide and rule”-policy in 
order to obtain control and be able to extract tax payments.17  
 
Despite the fact that the Sudanese to a large degree were able to sustain their old tribal 
systems, the Turco-Egyptian rules were unpopular because of their alien and demanding 
nature. This was carried out through heavy taxation, plundering and exploitation at the 
expense of the Sudanese, with the Daftardar as ruler being particularly known for his 
cruelty. 18  Another issue that formed the basis for resistance against the foreign 
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administration was its attempt to abolish the widespread slave trade. Slave raiding was a 
very lucrative business for the traders and had initially blossomed under the Turco-
Egyptian rule, reaching a high point in the 1870s.19 In addition to being a source of 
revenue for the traders, the use of slaves had become an important source of agricultural 
labour in the Sudanese society. 20  The Baggara, who had become one of the major 
purchasers of slaves in the Kordofan region, were now able to acquire guns and horses 
which gave them a technological advantage.21 However, the British involvement in Egypt 
starting in 1875 also had an impact on the Sudanese society and the possibility to 
commence in slave trade.  
 
In 1877 the British general Charles George Gordon22 was appointed Governor-General of 
the Sudan, and the same year Egypt and Great Britain concluded on a convention stating 
that slave trade was prohibited. Although this reform in reality only lasted a couple of 
years, the attempt to halt the slave raiding was met with great resistance, and resulted in 
the slave traders forming one of the significant groups that supported the Mahdist 
revolution at its outbreak in 1881.23 The Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad b. ‘Abdallah, lead 
the religiously founded uprising which was strengthened by the political, social and 
economic strains inflicted on the Sudan. The Mahdists were able to defeat the Egyptian 
forces, and by 1884 the rebels had obtained control over most of the country. The battle 
of Khartoum on January 26th 1885 marked the Mahdist’s final victory over the Egyptian 
administration. The British, who in 1882 had won the battle of Tel El-Kebir making 
Egypt a de facto British protectorate, attempted to aid the Egyptian forces. Their 
contribution was however insufficient and resulted in General Gordon being killed by the 
Mahdists. After coming to power the Mahdist established an indigenous Islamic state 
with a new leadership built on the administrative foundation laid by the Egyptians.  
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During the Mahdist years the tribal system was subjected to a number of changes. The 
Mahdists recruited supporting sheikhs and members of their tribes for military positions, 
while other tribes were forced to move and seek refuge an account of their resistance 
against the new regime. Tribal leaders not in favour of the Mahdists were dismissed from 
office, kept under house arrest or killed. The result of this was that the Mahdia regime 
undermined the political structure of the tribal organisation in the Kordofan province.24  
 
During the Mahdist uprising the Baggara formed one of the three most important groups 
who supported the Mahdist revolution and made its success possible.25 The Baggara had 
suffered greatly in the hands of the foreign rulers, and were also driven by economic 
motives such as being able to continue making profits out of slave trading, escaping high 
taxes, together with the possibility to acquire booty from defeated rivals. The religious 
aspect of the revolt was on the other hand a less important factor for the Baggara. The 
support was based on the close relationship between the Mahdi and the Khalifa 
‘Abdallahi b. Mohammad El-Ta’ishi of the Rizeygat.26  Among the tribes previously 
forming the Messiria the Zurug were opposed the Mahdist movement, while the majority 
of the Humr joined the Mahdists under the leadership of Hammad Rigeyat. The non-
Mahdist Humr where thrown out of Dar Messiria and sought refuge among the Ngok and 
their Chief Arob Biong until the end of the Mahdia.  
 
When the Mahdi died in 1885 he was succeeded by the supreme Khalifa ‘Abdallahi. 27 As 
a measure to secure his position as the new leader, the Khalifa ordered his Baggara 
supporters to move and settle in Omdurman. The result of this was that many of the 
Humr followers left their home around the Muglad and migrated north. This compulsory 
migration severely depopulated Dar Humr, which again had an effect on the spread and 
organization of other tribes in the region. When the Mahdist state collapsed in 1898, the 
tribes who had been scattered by the Mahdist rebel forces began returning to their 
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previous homes and gradually restoring their old tribal systems. The Baggara who had 
moved to Omdurman also begun heading back towards their dars in Western-Kordofan 
and Darfur.  
 
Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation and direct rule  
In 1898 Egyptian and British forces defeated the Mahdists and ended the almost fifteen 
year long era of indigenous religious rule. An agreement was signed on the 19th of 
January the following year, establishing a shared British and Egyptian rule known as the 
Condominium. Although the two countries had agreed on a joint rule, the administrative 
power to a large extent fell into the hands of the British, and a British Governor General 
was appointed as the highest ruling officer in the Sudan, subordinate to the British Consul 
General in Cairo.28 
 
In the early Condominium years the new administration was dominated by the central 
government in Khartoum. The whole Kordofan province was placed under the Anglo-
Egyptian forces which took over the province headquarters El-Obeid. The ruling 
hierarchy in the provinces was built on the administrative foundation created by the 
Turco-Egyptian rulers. Provinces were ruled by a British governor (mudir), assisted by a 
few British inspectors (mufattishin) and several Egyptian sub-governors (mamurs). The 
province governor was in charge of security, tax collection, land registration, the 
provincial treasury and the judicial system. He was also responsible for other provincial 
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Map 2: The district division and major tribes of the Kordofan province (1929)29 
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In each province two British Inspectors were appointed to act as supervisor for the other 
members of the local government, and to make sure that the orders and regulations issued 
by the governor were rightly executed. The provinces were further divided into districts 
administered by sub-governors who were appointed from among Egyptian officers. 
Kordofan province was initially divided into ten districts, but these were later reduced to 
six.30 The sub-governors’ job was mainly to fill in reports on the information that they 
collected while travelling around the province in order to provide the British government 
with an overview of the rural areas of the Sudan.31 This information was forwarded 
monthly to the central rulers in Khartoum through Intelligence Reports. The sub-
governors were also in charge of registering land and cattle, collecting tax, as well as 
instructing village sheikhs in the rules and regulations of the government and making 
sure that these were followed.32 They were again assisted by a small number of police 
staff also recruited from the Egyptian army. In addition to this there were a few other 
members of the local administration with various duties. While government officials in 
the earliest years of the Condominium had a military background, the administration 
became more civil throughout the first decades of the 20th century.33 
 
The Condominium government encountered various difficulties that could potentially 
threaten the new rule. To gain legitimacy and undermine the former Mahdist rule it was 
important for the British to mark a separation between the new government and that of 
the “dervishes”34 , which had created unrest and division within the traditional tribal 
systems. It was ordered that the new administration should try to establish a good 
relationship with the Sudanese population, and that they should be treated with respect.35 
The British sought to base their governing power on personal dealings with tribal leaders 
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whom they could rely on. Many members of the British administration established strong 
positions in the provinces and close relationships with tribal leaders. However, this form 
of direct administration lead by the central powers in Khartoum and built around personal 
connections to influential tribal members in the provinces, proved to be less than optimal. 
The disadvantages of this system became more and more apparent throughout the first 
two decades of Condominium rule.  
 
Motives behind a new provincial administration 
The shift towards a new form of local administration was motivated by several factors, 
caused both by problems within the government and outside forces. The number of 
British officials in the Condominium administration, both military and civilian, had 
always been low, and due to financial reason only the highest posts of the administration 
could be filled. Posts filled by other nationalities, mainly Egyptians, created the backbone 
of the district administration, but these members of the administration never attained an 
equally high rank in the central or provincial government.36 During the first period of 
Condominium rule a growing dissatisfaction with the Egyptian members of the 
administration became evident. A general negative attitude towards the Egyptian co-
rulers had become common among the British officials and they were accused of 
corruption, insensitivity and unscrupulous methods. While the British inspectors were 
given credit for government success, the mamurs were blamed for administrative failures.  
 
In 1912 the British started to appoint Sudanese sub-mamurs to assist the Egyptian 
mamurs with the increasing work in the districts. The sub-mamurs were selected from 
members of important Sudanese families, but who also had to have the right education, 
age and character to be chosen.37 The employment of sub-mamurs was motivated not 
only by practical benefits, but also by the wish to reduce the influence of the mamurs. 
The Egyptian element in the Sudan was also resented by the Sudanese. Influential 
religious leaders were among those who expressed their concern with the Sudan being 
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under Egyptian control.38 They preferred the Sudanese to be a people governed by their 
own laws, customs and administration, guided by the British and strongly felt the urge to 
eliminate the disliked and mistrusted Egyptians from the government.  
 
The uneasiness of the British government officials was enhanced by the suspicion of the 
growing Egyptian nationalism. From 1919 to 1924 three different events took place 
which worsened the already tense relationship between the two condominium powers. 
The first of these incidents were the Egyptian revolution that sprung out in Cairo in 
1919.39 After this the British urge to weaken the Egyptian influence in the Sudan grew 
stronger. The trouble was that the Egyptian officials made up a large number in the 
administration which needed to be replaced. One alternative was to replace them with 
members of the educated Sudanese elite (the effendia) which originally had been needed 
in order to fill the subordinate positions within the bureaucracy of the new Condominium 
administration. However, the British fear was that the nationalist Egyptian tendencies had 
influenced the effendia and created a discontent with the alien ruling power, and 
educating more Sudanese would eventually lead to a similar situation as in Egypt.40 This 
made the British officials apprehensive of this alternative, and instead turned to the 
thought of using tribal authorities as their governmental agents. Their choice stood 
between changing personnel and changing the administrative system in itself.41 
 
The hope was that by strengthening the traditional power structures within the tribal 
society and giving them positions within the local administrations would help combat 
several dangers; Firstly to stagger the expansion of the effendia, and weaken the growing 
individualist and nationalist ideas.42 Secondly, rebuilding a strong tribal leadership could 
weaken the power of religious leaders who potentially represented a threat to the British 
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central government, like Sayyid Abd El-Rahman El-Mahdi43, Sayyid ‘Ali El-Mirghani44, 
and El-Sharif Yusuf El-Hindi45, since neglecting the wishes of the Sudanese people might 
lead to a re-occurrence of religious fanaticism and a spread of Pan-Islamic ideas.46 
Thirdly it was a wise move to grant the local leadership with more power before this 
became a demand, and hence a possible cause of local agitation. Also, the Sudanese had 
supported the government during the First World War which underlined the British 
reliance on cooperation with tribal leaders, and made it fair to recognise and reward this 
support. 47  
 
In 1924 two more instances took place that shook the British rulers. The first was the 
demonstration of the White Flag League in Khartoum which was a result of the British 
having lost the confidence of the educated Sudanese. 48  The same year the British 
Governor-General of Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was shot and killed in an assassination in 
Cairo. This was the last of three serious events causing outside pressure on the British 
and lead to a change regarding the governing of the Sudan.  The same year the Egyptian 
mamurs were dismissed from their positions in the Sudan and they were soon expelled.  
The British government’s loss of confidence in the educated Sudanese elite also resulted 
in the powers of the sub-mamurs being reduced and finally in 1927 the recruitment to 
these posts ceased altogether.49  
  
Some of the motivating factors behind an administrative reorganisation were problems 
which sprung up inside the government itself, and one of these was the need to cut 
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expenses. Delegating power and responsibilities to local tribe members was cheaper than 
hiring educated civil servants to do the same job. Although the number of British officials 
in the Sudan was relatively low, the number of staff had slowly grown as the 
Condominium rulers had become more and more settled in the country. 50  British 
administrative officials were also carrying out routine services which could easily be 
done by less educated staff, and the establishment of a Native Administration could hence 
let them concentrate on carrying out more advanced assignments. The British 
government’s previous reliance on men with military background to fill the roles of the 
mudir and inspectors had not proved to work out well, and rapid change of staff was a 
problem. This resulted in the personnel not having enough intimate knowledge of the 
district under their supervision and was an additional reason why a change was needed.  
 
Finally, it has been claimed that one of the reasons behind a new administrative policy 
was the passing of the gilded age in Europe. The result was an alteration in the way of 
thinking which made representatives of the British administration in London and Western 
anthropologists wanted to preserve the remnants of the local communities in the colonies 
and resurrect the Sudanese social system which had largely broken up.51 It was regarded 
as Britain’s duty to guide the Sudanese back to a path on which they had been embarked 
for centuries, before outside forces had diverted them.  
 
Early steps towards Native Administration 
The political and administrative challenges that the British faced in the Sudan during the 
early years of the Condominium had revealed a need for a structural reorganisation. This 
resulted in the gradual shift towards a new administrative system in the districts called 
Native Administration. The groundwork for shaping the principles of Native 
Administration were laid by Fredric Lugard who had served as British High 
Commissioner (1900-1906) and later also Governor General (1912-1919) in Nigeria. He 
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presented a system of indirect rule that had previously been tested in other colonial areas 
such as the Gold Cost, Malaya, and both Eastern and Northern Nigeria. The policies used 
in these areas were further developed by Lugard into a more elaborate system based on 
four fundamental factors; Local sheikhs being appointed to rule and form a political 
hierarchy in the districts, a parallel hierarchy of native courts being established, local 
treasuries being formed, and British staff being appointed to supervise and guide the 
members of the local administration. 52 
 
The principles of Native Administration were not introduced to the Sudan as a whole, but 
were first tried out in suitable areas. Darfur and Kordofan in the west were ideal for this 
purpose because of the tribal structures in these provinces were still largely intact, and 
tribal leaders already had been able to maintain a great deal of authority. 53  As a contrast 
other areas of the Sudan had become greatly detribalized, which made it more difficult to 
get people to accept tribal leaders as new members of the local administration since 
customary powers of tribal sheikhs was previously recognized. Kordofan was inhabited 
by a large number of nomadic tribes living in vast rural areas, and the traditional 
hierarchical structure was still widespread.  
 
The process of integrating Sudanese representatives in the local administration had begun 
already in 1912 with the appointing of sub-mamurs to assist the Egyptian mamurs. The 
British rulers carefully selected these among sufficiently educated Sudanese from 
important families and made up a class of minor officials who was to be in close contact 
with the people in the districts. In this way some of the local sheikhs were included into 
the hierarchical power structure and regained some of the political influence they had had 
prior to the Mahdist uprising. During the next few years small steps were taken towards 
giving more power to both sheiks of nomad tribes, as well as sedentary tribal groups in 
Kordofan. The result of these changes was a growing interest in the new administrative 
system.  
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In his note on the administrative policy from 1917 C. A. Wills54 pointed to the benefits of 
enabling influential Sudanese to administer justice, and suggested that a court of a few 
appointed leading men should be established in the “more enlightened districts”.55 This 
court would be supervised by the British authorities who could overrule its decisions if 
felt necessary. Willis argued that an opening of the representation of the country families 
would not only increase the government’s authority by this being a popular idea among 
the native population, but also because it meant that the Sudanese would learn more 
about the administrative difficulties and hence understanding and accept the methods of 
the government better. In addition it would lessen the workload of the province sub-
governors. The Darfur province was considered even better suited for the introduction of 
Native Administration, and in 1917, one year after the British had conquered this 
province from Ali Dinar 56 , the tribal leaders in this province were given the same 
administrative powers as those in Kordofan.57 The current provincial governor of Darfur, 
R. V. Savile further extended this system by giving tribal leaders the powers to hear 
minor criminal cases and impose certain punishments. 
 
One important step towards setting up a system of Native Administration in the provinces 
was the re-establishment of nazirs. This title had also been used during the Turco-
Egyptian period to describe tribal leaders with administrative position. The first to be 
appointed nazirs were the leaders for the largest nomadic tribes in North and South-
Kordofan. In 1911 the position of Omda was introduced as a part of the local 
government. This title was given to leaders of sub-groups within a tribe inferior to the 
nazir on top. The omdas were also appointed as an attempt to reduce the influence of 
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nazirs who were regarded as too powerful by the British.58 In the central areas of the 
province inhabited by more sedentary tribes, omdas were appointed as leaders for their 
respective omodias. 59  In addition to this a number of sheikhs were given smaller 
responsibilities on the lowest administrative level. The sheikhs were appointed among the 
villagers by the central government, and functioned as an extended arm of the central 
government carrying out duties which needed to be done.  
 
The introduction of new administrative ideas and a dual policy 
In the early stages of introducing new administrative ideas opinions differed about 
whether or not a shift from direct to Native Administration was a step in the right 
direction. Many of the British officials in provinces other than Kordofan and Darfur were 
less enthusiastic about the reform, and doubted the sheikhs’ ability to be integrated as 
members of the provincial government. Skilled representatives were however hard to 
find, and sheikhs were tried out as poorly paid members of the administration generally 
viewed with a “watching” eye by the British rulers. Notes from the province governors 
meeting in January 1918 show that the process of including members of the Sudanese 
tribes in the local administration had spread to the Blue Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea 
Province.60 This tendency became stronger in the following years, and notes from the 
Northern Governors Meeting in 1920 express a general agreement to adopt the policy 
used in Kordofan to the other Northern provinces to support the “solid elements of the 
country” in order to weaken the powers of the educated elite.61  
 
In 1921 Lord Milner 62  published a report which supported the idea of Native 
Administration stating that the Sudan was best served through a decentralized 
administration in the hands of Sudanese authorities, supervised by the British central 
                                                 
58
 Howell 1948: SAD 786/6/7. Paul Philip Howell was an officer of the Sudan Political Service from 1938-
1955. During this time he was stationed in Kordofan from 1946-1948. 
59
 The omodia consisted of the village and area around which was a part of the tribes Dar. 
60
 Governors’ Meeting, January 23, 1918  in Abu Shouk and Bjørkelo (eds.) 2004: 69 
61
 Northern Governors’ Meeting, 1920. Powers of Native Chiefs and Sheikhs in Abu Shouk and Bjørkelo 
(eds.) 2004: 79 
62
 The British statesman Lord Alfred Milner led a commission assigned to investigate and report on the 
reasons behind the Egyptian revolution in 1919. In this report he also commented on the situation in Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan  
27 
 
government.63 He felt that although a common platform needed to be maintained with 
regard to regulating the waters of the Nile which both countries depended on, the Sudan 
should be governed without Egyptian interference. However, the establishment of a 
centralized bureaucracy was not desired, but a decentralized administration made up by 
members of the Sudanese population. These authorities could be separated into two 
groups; the officials selected from leading Sudanese families who already served as 
members of the local administration (sub-mamurs), and the sheiks who ruled the different 
tribes and had attained a powerful position on the basis of this.  
 
The Assistant Civil Secretary Harold MacMichael64 had studied the tribal societies of 
Kordofan and Darfur during his years of serving there. He was of the opinion that the 
tribal organization of the nomads as very suitable as a basis for a local administrative 
system.65 Although many tribes had disintegrated with their leaders losing a lot of their 
power during the Mahdia, MacMichael still felt that the sheik’s traditional authority was 
strong enough among the nomads to be revived so that they could be further integrated in 
the local administration. He was nevertheless not among the most radical promoters of 
Native Administration and remained a supporter of Sir Lee Stack’s dual policy until 
1924. A result of the growing support of decentralized administration was the passing of 
“The Powers of Nomads Sheiks Ordinance” in 1922. This ordinance intended to regulate 
the judicial powers of sheiks of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. This meant that the 
sheikhs were granted the power to rule among their tribesmen within the limits 
considered desirable in each case by the province governor, and gave them the power to 
decide a suitable punishment in criminal cases and settle conflicts within the tribe. 66 
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More serious crimes were still handled by the British officials, who also had the power to 
overrule any decision made by the local courts.  
 
The ordinance of 1922 did not open for a full scale introduction of Native 
Administration, but kept some restrictions regarding the powers given to the tribal 
leaders. The current governor-general, Sir Lee Stack (1917-1924), was sceptical of a total 
administrative reform, but fronted what has been called a dual policy. 67  Stack still 
recognized that the Sudan’s financial problems, as well as other potential difficulties, 
could be solved by taking steps in the direction of Native Administration. His dual policy 
hence sought to reduce administrative expenses in the rural areas by giving the local 
sheiks more power, but at the same time established village courts and public advisory 
councils to make sure that some of the administrative power remained in the provincial 
centres under government supervision. Advisory Councils were informal meetings with 
sheiks and should be held by the Governors and District Governors from time to time in 
all the Northern Provinces.68 Bence-Penbroke was one the critics of a dual policy and in 
his opinion a trial and error period of Native Administration was meaningless and had no 
real effect. It gave the Sudanese authorities no real power since the administrative system 
as a whole was on trial, and he meant that stalling the process of letting the Sudanese run 
their own administration meant opening the door further for education and nationalism.69 
 
The assassination of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo in 1924 threw the political future of the Sudan 
out in a serious discussion. Many were now in favour of a more speedy development 
towards Native Administration. The many events which had taken place, as well as the 
general atmosphere of the early 1920s, made it ever more clearly to the British officials 
that the Sudan was ready for an administrative reorganisation. The 1924 crisis hence 
marked the end of the dual policy, and opened up for a broader introduction of Native 
Administration.  
 
                                                 
67
 Daly 1986: 363 
68
 Northern Governors Meeting 1925 in Abu Shouk and Bjørkelo (eds.) 2004: 119 
69
 Bence-Pembroke: The Administrative Policy and Sudanese Nationalism, 1927 in Abu Shouk and 
Bjørkelo (eds.) 2004: 144 
29 
 
Further expansion of the Native Administration policy 
The tendency to support the new administrative policy was further strengthened by Sir 
Reginald Davies70 handing over his notes on Native Administration in Northern Nigeria 
in 1925. Davies he had stayed there in order to observe the organization and functionality 
of this administrative system in order to see whether or not a similar administrative 
system could be adapted in the Sudan.71 His notes described the hierarchical organisation 
of the Native Administration, how it differed from the central government, and the 
relationship between the Political Officers and the different personnel and organs and of 
the Native Administration. Although he felt that the system would have to be developed 
to suit both the sedentary and nomadic population, Davies believed that it would be 
possible to apply the Nigerian system without considerable modifications to large regions 
of the Sudan. He found the Sudanese system of nazirs, omdas and sheiks perfect to 
correspond with the Nigerian system of emirs, district heads, village heads and hamlet 
heads, and was certain that the tribal leaders of the Sudan was capable of administration 
given the same amount of responsibilities and under the same supervision as their 
Nigerian counterparts. On the basis of this Davies came to the conclusion that “no 
administration of native races by white men” could be perfect, but the policy of Native 
Administration had proved fruitful both economically and politically looking at the 
Nigerian results.72  
 
The Northern Governors Meeting’s reaction to Reginald Davies report from Nigeria was 
positive, and recommended the drafting of a “Native Courts Ordinance” establishing 
Sudanese courts appointed by the province governor. Before the Anglo-Egyptian 
reoccupation there had been no formal structures that could help the tribal leadership to 
exercise their power, such as courts, prisons or police to handle disputes. The tribe 
depended on a council of elders who made their decisions based on tribal custom or the 
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general opinion of the lineage. These loosely organized councils were now transformed 
into local courts whose powers and jurisdiction were founded on British legislation. The 
local courts were created for three purposes: to establish a local system where to settle 
local disputes based on customary law and government regulations, to organize the 
leaders of different tribal groups into courts who could settle inter-tribal conflicts, and to 
give the members of administration judicial powers in order to be able to execute their 
administrative duties with efficiency.73  
 
The religious elements within the courts however caused reason for debate. The meeting 
found that the Native courts should not be religiously founded as the Nigerian courts, but 
continue to stay secular to prevent any religious leaders to take advantage of the Native 
court system to gain political influence. Instead religious notables were to be made 
magistrates of the courts. MacMichael on the other hand went further in précising that 
these Native courts should be definitely secular in order to strengthen the powers of the 
secular leaders as a counterweight to the men of religious standing, who always, 
according to him, would carry much weight in the Sudan.74 In MacMichael opinion it 
would be wiser to not establish village courts as suggested by the governors in the 
Village Courts Ordinance, but to restrict these to towns in order to not create a conflict in 
authority with the nomad sheiks power to administer their own tribes.  
 
With the new Governor-General Sir John Maffey75, the old dual policy was abandoned 
and the advisory councils, previously favoured by Stack, seen as dangerous platforms for 
the Sudanese Intelligentsia to take advantage of. Sarsfield-Hall, the current governor of 
the Kordofan province, supported Maffey’s new direction regarding Native 
Administration and stated that a bold forward policy should be adopted which gave the 
tribal sheikhs a large amount of independence and definite powers of governance over 
their people in order to make them real and effective rulers.76 In 1927 “The Power of 
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Sheikhs Ordinance” was passed. This ordinance extended the grant of judicial powers to 
include tribal leaders of sedentary tribes, as well as territorial sheikhs, and not only 
nomadic sheikhs as the ordinance of 1922. Further it opened up for an increased authority 
of the nomadic sheikhs. In some cases Native Administration was introduced among 
people who lacked any memory of a tribal structure or authority power was granted to 
“sheikhs” without any form of hereditary precedence. One of those in favour of this was 
Reginald Davies, who pointed out that not only existing or formally existing tribal 
authorities should be made members of Native Administration, but that it also should be 
considered legitimate to add “evolved” authorities to the list.77 
 
The 1927-ordinance first delegated more power to Sudanese authorities with regard to 
judicial activities. Introducing the new administrative policy first on the judicial side had 
the advantages of meeting little resistance, and mad it possible to include tribes where the 
tribal organization had become weak and the hierarchy was dissolved.78 Three types of 
courts were established under Native Administration: The tribal courts, village courts and 
civil courts (government courts). In addition to this there existed Mohammedan Law 
Courts. Tribal courts were set up in the large tribes with a nazir functioning as court 
president with a panel of important members of the tribe. These courts had the power to 
rule in criminal, civil and domestic cases arising within the limits of their jurisdiction. To 
avoid jurisdictional clashes between sheikh’s courts and Mohammedan Law Courts, 
guidelines were set up.  
 
An additional point expressed in the ordinance of 1927 was that the sheiks could no 
longer “eat” the fines obtained through the judicial system, but were paid a regular salary 
and had to pay all imposed fines to the government.79 The year after an amendment of 
this ordinance was passed in order to correct errors and point out that a court could not 
have a wider scope than the administrative jurisdiction. It also established courts for 
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settling of inter-tribal and inter-regional disputes. One argument behind the need for 
inter-tribal courts was that most tribes was too small to keep their courts busy, another 
was that most disputes was inter-tribal anyway. 
 
After the new policies of 1927 and -28, there still existed members of the British 
government who felt that the sheikhs should be freer to exercise their individual powers, 
and wanted to shorten the list of offences which were excluded from the tribal and village 
courts.80 In 1932 “The Native Courts Ordinance” was passed as the last important Native 
Administration legislation under Maffey’s Governor-Generalship.81 It aimed to provide 
one statutory basis for Native Administration in Northern Sudan where all the various 
previous enactments were incorporated. However, at this stage the attitudes towards 
further extending the limits of the tribal leadership had begun to shift. Now even 
Reginald Davies, who had been one of the keenest promoters of Native Administration, 
agreed that the administrative advances should consider the various administrative needs 
in the different areas of the country, as the dual policy of Sir Lee Stack originally had 
done. This trend gradually grew stronger and “The Local Government (Rural Area) 
Ordinance” of 1937 marked the end of the expansion of Native Administration.  
 
The reasons behind why Native Administration had gone from being viewed as a 
successful policy, to a being perceived as failing, were several; Sudan’s economic 
development, the bureaucratic government, an emerging educated class, nationalist 
politics and Anglo-Egyptian rivalry.82 Kordofan and Darfur were not equipped to deal 
with these changes and the lack of governmental effort to focus on administration of law, 
public order, education, public health and other necessary goods led to Western Sudan 
ending up in a permanent backwater. According to Daly it had become clear the Native 
Administration policy was at a dead end already in 1934 when Maffey left the position of 
Governor-General and was succeeded by Sir Stewart Symes. 
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When was Native Administration really introduced?  
Viewing the official documents of the British government one can argue that the Sudan 
was more or less centrally governed until Lord Milner published his report in 1921, and 
that Native Administration was only fully introduced until after Governor-Generalship of 
Sir Lee Stack had ended.83 The events of 1924 convinced the British officials that a 
change was needed and led to a shift towards a faster and more extensive inclusion of the 
tribal leadership into the local administration. Still, it can be debated whether Native 
Administration in reality was introduced much earlier in provinces such as Darfur and 
Kordofan. 
 
The British administrators placed in Kordofan had from the beginning of the 
Condominium been authorised to govern the province with little interference from the 
central powers. This vast province was inhabited by a population who were alien to the 
British not only regarding language, but also with respect to political institutions and 
customs. In order to gain control in spite of the communication difficulties and the 
shortage of staff, the administration hence adopted a form of Native Administration.84 
According to Daly, British officials who had worked in the Kordofan province knew that 
an informal policy of Native Administration had existed ever since 1898, and the annual 
“inspections” that took place should rather be viewed as an act to show its presence than 
the British rulers actually laying down the law.85 This meant that there was little change 
with the adoption of Native Administration in the 1920s. Everything depended upon the 
sheiks personality and the willingness of the government to support him even where the 
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Chapter 3: The Humr 
 
The ecological premises of Dar Humr  
The Humr and Zurug, together forming the Messiria tribe, inhabited the southern regions 
of the Western Kordofan district. This district was an administrative unit which they 
shared with the Hamar, who lived in the areas covered with rolling sand dunes further 
north. The district capital was Nahud, situated within Dar Hamar approximately 140 
miles south-west of the province headquarters, El-Obeid. Further north of Hamar land 
were the even dryer areas of the Kababish nomads. East of the Messiria lands lay the 
Nuba Mountains, and in the west was Darfur. The landscape surrounding the Messiria 
was mainly flat and contrasted the mountainous areas of the Nuba. Southwards Dar 
Messiria bordered Dinka territory along the Bahr El-Arab. The Bahr El-Arab was the 
most distinctive river in the district, its size naturally being at its’ largest during the 
rains.86 Other important streams in the district were the Wadi El-Ghalla and the Shalengo, 
both drying up during the dry season. The Keilak and Abyei lakes were the most 
significant lakes. Many different types of grass grew in the region, and vast areas were 
thickly forested. 
 
Muglad was the primary town within Dar Humr, and was also the Humr’s administrative 
capital. During the Mahdist period many towns and villages had been destroyed, and 
people were driven from their land. As a result several regions within western Kordofan 
experienced population growth in the first decades of the 20th century.87 Muglad had the 
largest organized market within Dar Humr.88 Throughout the years Muglad also became 
an important centre of Dar Humr in other ways by attaining a double pump station set up 
by the British government, a hospital (although without a doctor), an elementary school, 
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and a sub grade school. Muglad town was connected by road to El-Odaia all year round, 
and to Lake Keilak and Abyei between November and April, when the weather was dry 
enough. 
 
The annual migration cycle 
The savannah belt which the Humr inhabited had a various amount of rainfall from north 
to south.89 This made it necessary to move with the seasons in order to obtain enough 
drinking water for both men and cattle. The nomads moved in a regular cycle throughout 
the year, depending on rainfall. The rains’ influence on the soil and vegetation regulated 
the conditions for grazing and cultivation of millet and cotton. Also if the ground became 
too muddy it affected the cattle’s ability to move around and the humidity level affected 
the number of insects present.90 Throughout the year Humr moved within four main 
regions: The Babanusa, the Muglad, the Goz and the Bahr. The Babanusa was a relatively 
small sandy area in the north and north-west of Dar Humr. This area was thickly wooded 
with low trees and bushes, and was used for grazing during the rains from approximately 
July to September. In the dry periods however, the area was not inhabitable, and the 
nomads moved south towards the Muglad. 
 
The Muglad region had rich water supply, good grazing and was the main cultivating 
area for the Agaira section of the Humr tribe. The nomads stayed here for two parts of the 
year; before (Mai-July) and after (September-December) the rainy season. It was 
common to camp together while staying here, and grow millet fertilized with manure 
from the cows which they kept inside the camp during the night. When the grazing in the 
Muglad was finished around December, the Humr moved further south towards Wadi El-
                                                 
89
 The Humr migration has been described by several British officials who had served in Western Kordofan 
at different times, and made observations on the lifestyle of the tribes in the district. With reference to the 
Humr the observations of P.P. Howell, A.C. Beaton and Ian Cunnison stand out. Their descriptions may not 
be precisely coinciding, but small variations may have been caused by yearly changes in the physical 
environment of Dar Humr. I have tried to make a general description of the migration cycle based on notes 
from all the various sources. A good overview may be also found in Howell 1948: SAD 768/6/68-69. 
90
 The most common insects in Dar Humr are mosquitoes and flies of different sorts. The flies are avoided 
since they can disturb the grazing or be carriers of decease. The tsetse fly, which can cause sleeping 
sickness among humans and nagana (leads to reduced growth, strength, milk quality, and eventually results 
in death) among cattle, does not occur in Dar Humr. 
36 
 
Ghalla in the Bahr region, named after the Bahr El-Arab that penetrated the area in the 
south.91 On their way they moved through the Goz, an area similar to the Babanusa lying 
between the Muglad and the Bahr, but more wet and less infested with insects. The Goz 
was seldom used for camps of long duration.  
 
For the latter part of the dry season the Humr camped in the Bahr region and took 
advantage of its watercourses connected to the Bahr El-Arab and eventually to the White 
Nile. The Bahr was a varied area with rich grasslands and swamp zones. Further east was 
an area with less water and in the south-east lay Lake Keilak, and Lake Abyad on the 
Ruweng Dinka border beyond. Towards the end of the dry season lack of grazing, more 
bothersome insects and muddy ground made it more difficult to stay in this region. In 
addition to the physical conditions, relationships with neighbouring tribes influenced the 
Humr migration cycle. The Dinka had permanent settlements in the Bahr region, but 
stayed south of the river for most of the dry season. Around April/Mai they started 
moving northwards, and the Humr begun returning to the Muglad where they then stayed 
until the rains again forced them to migrate further north to the Babanusa.  
 
The Humr’s two main sections lived and moved in different areas, where the Felaita 
movement was more north-west to south-east compared with the Agaira north-south 
movement. While the Agaira migrated south into the Bahr, the Felaita moved south-east 
to the area around Lake Keilak. The Zurug lived east of Dar Humr and also moved in 
three different zones throughout the year, with the Dagag corresponding to the Muglad 
region. The equivalent of the Babanusa lay along the Hamar border, and in the south-east 
the upper reaches of the Wadi El-Ghalla were used during the dry season.  
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Map 3: The migration routs of the Messiria omodias.92 
 
Pastoralism, agriculture and the importance of cattle 
The Humrs’ primary concerns were their cattle and the seasonal movements mainly 
depended on which area the cattlemen judged to have the best combination of factors for 
the cattle. The Baggara in general were called the “parasite of the cow”, and their most 
essential household products came from the cow; milk, butter, cheese, meat and leather 
etc.93 Both Humr and Zurug cattle were very mixed and therefore of poor quality. This 
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was a result of the drop in the number of cattle during the Mahdia which made it 
necessary to purchase new live stock from different neighbouring cattle owners in the 
beginning of the 20th century.94 The stock however grew fast during the early decades of 
Anglo-Egyptian rule, and it was lack of water supply rather than lack of grazing that 
controlled its further expansion.95  
 
Crop production in Dar Humr was limited. The main reason behind this was that 
agriculture demanded weeks of settlement and was therefore naturally incompatible with 
nomadic migrations over long distances. A second reason was the strong prejudice 
against activities which interfered with the pastoral lifestyle. The Humr viewed a 
sedentary lifestyle based on agriculture as inferior to the free nomadic way of life, and 
those who were forced to become agriculturalists as a result of outer circumstances, 
would return to being pastoralists as soon as they had enough money to buy new cattle.96 
If there was a shortage in grain, this was bought with money acquired trough the sale of 
cattle, sheep, goats, or animal products such as butter or hides.  
 
The Humr however saw the advantage of producing grain for their own use and hence 
limiting the sale of cattle. Ian Cunnison, who stayed among the Humr in periods between 
1952 and 1955, claimed that it was a wonder that the Humr cultivated as much as they 
did.97 To manage the task of crop production combined with the pastoral lifestyle, the 
nomads had developed a cooperative system. This included shared herding in the planting 
and harvesting seasons, and leaving some of the camp members behind to look after the 
crop or grain depot in seasons when the rest of the tribe moved to a different area.98 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
had been forced by circumstances to live in a country which would support the cow and not the camel”. 
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Humr mainly cultivated bulrush millet, ground nuts, maize, and a few vegetables. A 
small number had settled down permanently in villages or near watering points and 
become sedentary.99  
 
Throughout the 1930s the British government introduced cotton growing schemes to Dar 
Humr, and in 1935 a cotton growing scheme was established at Lagowa. The money 
made by the nomads was used to buy more cattle.100 However, the cotton schemes had 
little effect on the pastoral lifestyle of the Humr and the variations in the world marked 
after the outbreak of the Second World War led to a severe decline in production, and 
finally to a halt.101 Melons also grew in the region, and were valuable as a water source 
for both men and animals during the dry season. The melon seeds could be dried and sold 
for a good price at the market. Other important products that were traded at the markets 
were grain, butter, and other animal products. Gum trees which grew in certain areas of 
Kordofan, were not common in Dar Humr.102 
 
For a pastoral nomad keeping cattle was the main interest, and not one of many elements 
of the economic life. The nomadic lifestyle of the Humr made it difficult to accumulate 
material possessions, and wealth was therefore measured in cattle. The number of cattle a 
man owned influenced his position and possibilities to become politically powerful.103 
Cattle were essential for a man to be able to provide food and transport for his family, 
and the products the cows made were the families’ basis for livelihood.104 For the Humr 
cattle were better than cash savings and material goods because they usually increased in 
numbers, and they were always useful. Cash, on the other hand, were necessary at times, 
but was of little value if a man was short of grain and far from the market.105 Other means 
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to pay for expenses such as taxes, marriage costs and labour could be found through 
selling agricultural products, sheep, goats, or labour for a short period.  
 
The British government made attempts to introduce new innovations to Dar Humr 
motivated by their whish to stimulate economic growth and improve the nomads’ return 
on agriculture and pastoralism. Because of the difference between the British and 
nomadic way of thinking such innovations were not always met with the same positive 
attitude by the Sudanese. Improvements that allowed the nomads to prosper in their own 
traditional ways were however welcomed. Two of the more significant British 
introductions were the production of cotton as well as veterinary clinics and the use of 
vaccines to improve the stock quality.106  
 
The Humrs’ wish to remain pastoral nomads, with their main goal being to acquire as 
much cattle as possible, also had an effect on their view on education. Few children were 
sent to school but in stead kept at home to learn how to take care of the cattle, which was 
a full time activity. Members of the tribe were raised to believe that all that was sweet in 
life came from the possession of cattle. Educating their children would therefore 
represent a threat since this could result in them becoming urbanized and give up the 
traditional pastoral lifestyle. Still the number of schools in Dar Humr grew somewhat in 
the Condominium period, with the British wanting to improve the possibilities for both 
boys and girls to obtain a low grade education.107 
 
The organization of the Humr tribe 
The land in Dar Humr was formally owned by the government, and there were no 
sectional land rights. The sectional boundaries were vague and this allowed the pastoral 
nomads to move to the areas where rain had fallen. Although the Humr in theory were 
free to move around as they wished, the seasonal movements tended to follow a relative 
set pattern. The various tribal segments inhabited different regions in the south-western 
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corner of Kordofan, and while the lines of migration went from north to south, the tribes 
organized themselves from east to west. The Humr’s two main segments, the Agaira and 
the Felaita, moved in separate regions with the Agaira staying further west bordering the 
Rizeygat Baggara in the southern regions of Darfur. The Zurug occupied the areas east of 
the Felaita. 
 
The territorial divisions were organized according to omodia. Omodias was an 
administrative unit which had been introduced by the British government in 1911. This 
unit corresponded to the next level of segmentation within the tribe, often referred to as 
bedana by the tribal members. Although the omodia was a regarded by some as a rather 
vague term, it had a value in producing administrative stability.108 The omodias could 
vary in size and was further divided into maximum and minimum lineages, called khasm 
el-beit (beyut – pl.), or clan.109 These were again divided into smaller segments, with the 
furqan (feriq – pl.) being the smallest segment of a tribe, corresponding to the size of an 
extended family.110 The tribe was built up around the idea that the segments were all 
connected by relation through patrilineal descent, with kinship ties being closest within 
the smallest segments. 
 
The term tribe was used somewhat fluently, and could refer to both larger and minor 
segments within a lineage.  At the same time as the Humr and the Zurug were called 
tribes, the Agaira and the Felaita segments were referred to in the same way.111 Because 
the Felaita and Agaira preferred to solve their differences peacefully more often than they 
engaged in war, it was suitable to view them as “primary tribal segments” of the Humr 
tribe.112 In contrast the Humr and the Zurug did not solve conflicts thought peaceful 
negotiations unless this was a result of government pressure, which made it more 
appropriate to regard these as two distinct tribes. Still, if referring to the Humr and the 
Zurug in relation to other tribes of the same Baggara group, such as the Rizeygat and the 
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Hawazma, the name Messiria was often used. In Howell’s opinion the Messiria had 
shown clear signs of being one tribe while arriving and settling in Western Kordofan, but 
expansion through natural increase and assimilation of late-comers made the Messiria 
grow apart and form two tribes.113 This he reckoned as usual characteristics of tribal 
evolution. 
 
The division of the Messiria into “Humr” (from the name Ahmar, meaning red) and 
“Zurug” (from the word Azrak, meaning blue or black) was interesting because it 
suggested that the two tribes to a various degree had mixed blood with members of black 
Dinka or Nuba tribes, which were mainly kept as slaves in the Messiria society. 
However, this did not correspond to the complexion of the two tribes, and the Humr 
could not be said to have any lighter skin than the Zurug. MacMichael pointed to a theory 
stating that these sub-divisions may have coincided originally with the division of all 
Arabic camel-owners and cattle-owners living in the north and south in general, and these 
names had been used as distinctions not only within the Messiria.114 There was however 
no real evidence to back up this statement.  
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Figure 3: The Agaira and Felaita omodias.115 
 
The different omodias occupied recognized areas throughout the year.116 Whether or not 
the segment moved as one body or was dispersed over a larger area, varied according to 
the season. Members of the same clan tended to settle closer to each other during the dry 
or wet season, but this was not an absolute rule.117 While staying in the cultivated area 
around Muglad, the members of the same segment could to be more dispersed. Although 
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the majority of one clan usually occupied one area, smaller lineages could be spread and 
more mixed than they would normally be. This was connected to the fact that each furqan 
could claim its own recognized plots of land, which was marked and returned to as long 
as the crops stayed good.118 If a new and more fertile piece of land was found that no one 
had previously claimed, the extended family could switch plots. In this way cultivation 
rights were upheld by a tribal customs, although no formal landownership rights existed. 
 
The Awlad Kamil was the largest of all Humr omodias and was a part of the Agaira 
branch.119 A large portion of this omodia was sedentary since it was not particularly rich 
in cattle. The omodia was further divided into 6 clans; Awlad Kimeil, the Kelabna, Dar 
Um Sheiba, Sar Salim, Dar Mota and Awlad Tuba.120 These clans were further divided 
into maximal and minimal lineages as follows:  
 
• Awlad Kimeil  
o Awlad Bakhit 
o Awlad Kahil 
o Awlad Zbdel Aziz 
• Kelabna121 
o Awlad Suleiman 
 Dirdiri 
 Rashim 
o Awlad Haran 
 Awlad Abdel Rahman Abu Nila 
 Nota’a 
• Dar Um Sheiba122 
o Zarga 
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 Awlad Shaili 
 Awlad Dakir 
 Awlad Gefeil 
 Awlad Um Helagi 
o Hamra 
 Awlad Abu Sabun 
 Awlad Abu Mamun 
• Dar Salim 
o Awlad Ghasibi 
o Awlad Bor 
o El Fadalla/Awlad Fadl 
• Dar Mota 
o El Karamalla 
o Awlad Fadl 
o Awlad Taluh 
• Awlad Tuba 
o Aiyal Safini 
o Awlad Abu Duheiba 
o Aiyal Fukkara 
o Aiyal El-Ghadani 
 
As a general rule the territorial cooperation grew stronger the smaller a segment was, and 
more reliance could be placed on mutual assistance in economic activity. Still, economic 
cooperation did not create an automatic social organisation, and the only social unit that 
was constantly bound up to economic and territorial bonds was the furqan. As the 
smallest tribal the furqan described a group of people with close kinship ties. This unit 
formed the group that moved and set up camp together throughout the year.123 A camp 
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consisted of a maximum of 20 tents, and was organized according to the extended 
family’s composition.124  
 
In its economic activities and seasonal movements the Humr tribe was sufficiently 
homogenous for a description of one furqan to count for the whole tribe. Ideally a camp 
should make up a unit named after the furqan’s senior living male and consist of the 
males of a furqan and those dependent on them. It should move, settle, look after the 
herds and shear the burdens of hospitality together, as well as exhibit complete solidarity. 
In reality, however, a furqan seldom stayed together in one camp. Instead some of the 
furqan members stayed in splinter-camps, who settled near the other furqan members. 
The camp’s composition hence varied according to the season since members of one 
furqan could move differently according to cultivation and grazing possibilities.  
 
The close family ties within a furqan were generally upheld through marriages between 
members of the extended family. Marriage between cousins was usual among the Humr, 
and was preferred in order to retain wealth within the kinship group. The fact that a man 
had to ask permission from the male cousin of a girl who was intended to marry her, 
before he himself could show an interest, emphasized this principle. Still there was 
generally much freedom regarding marriages, and often a man would marry his cousin 
and then divorce her.125 Divorces were quite common in Baggara societies, especially 
among the ideal cousin marriages. After a divorce both parties were free to marry again, 
including someone form another furqan. The result of this was that a camp could include 
members of different feriqs and be more mixed than the ideal aim. According to Islamic 
law a man was allowed to have up to four wives, and usually some of these were from 
another furqan, or even from a different clan.126 
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Common features of a tribal segment 
If not for the purpose of marriage, people outside the furqan could become attached to a 
camp for economic reasons. A rich man with a big herd attract followers who were 
poorer and in need of a stronger and wealthier man for economic assistance. By lending 
or receiving a cow, or another form of economic assistance from a wealthier kinsman, the 
poorer party became in debt to his benefactor. In such cases the family-ties were not 
necessarily close, and a poor member of another furqan could join a new camp and 
change his affiliation to the furqan of his supporter. This form of dependency could 
develop into a patron-client relationship, which often also affected the patron’s political 
position. Since a man with many followers was more likely to make a name for himself, a 
man who owned a lot of cattle naturally acquired a leading role. His reputation and 
popularity was influenced by his generosity through the loans and gifts he handed out, or 
by his hospitability towards both kinsmen and strangers. Cattle ownership was linked to 
both domestic and political interests, and the ability to fulfil political aspirations started in 
the ability to control and maintain a family. In this way economic and political power was 
connected within the Humr tribe. Wealth brought both power and responsibility, and this 
created a drive towards always attaining a larger herd.127  
 
The significance of a camp, with the furqan at its basis, was clear. No matter how mixed 
the origins of a camp were it took its name from the furqan with which it was associated. 
A man’s reputation was associated with the reputation of his furqan. The cattle of one 
furqan were a unit, and the number of people dependant on this herd showed the ability 
of the furqan’s leading mans to attract kinsmen as economic dependants and adherents, 
which again boosted his reputation.128 A khasm el-beit or clan generally moved as a 
body, although feriqs often would break away temporarily, or even permanently, to join 
other clans. Throughout the year, members of the different segments could split and 
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reunite according to the seasonal conditions for the cattle, cultivation and division of 
labour.129  
 
Different segments had certain features in common, generally shared by the members of 
the same clan. Among these were having the same distinct drum call which was guarded 
and followed by the men, as well as the cattle, within the same group.130 These drum calls 
helped the members of one clan to stay close, even though they for some periods of the 
year were dispersed over a wide area. In thickly forested regions of Dar Humr these drum 
calls were also necessary for both men and cattle in order not to get lost. The drum calls 
were guarded, but could be sold to another clan in exchange for cattle. An additional 
feature which contributed to distinguish one segment from another was cattle branding. 
The Agaira, Felaita and Zurug cattle were all branded with different marks, and while for 
instance the Agaira marked their cows with a long curving line on the left hand rump, the 
Felaita’s mark was placed over the left eye.131  Further more each clan had its own 
distinctive mark, and each lineage had a special brand or ear mark. Marking the cattle 
two or more times made them easy to recognize. 
 
As an example of the common features of a segment, one can again look closer at the 
clans of the Awlad Kamil.  All of the six clans had distinct drum calls shared by all the 
members of the smaller segments. The cattle brands were on the other hand much more 
detailed according to lineage and family, and the markings indicated for instance that 
members of the Hawazma Baggara had changed their affiliation after having married into 
the Awla Fadl lineage of the Dar Mota clan and settled among the Agaira.132 
 
The duty to avenge in the event of a homicide was also closely linked to kinship rules. 
The tribal society was structured according to the ideas of common descent, which was 
clearly expressed if a tribal member was killed. If for example a Humrawi was killed by a 
Zurug, every member of the Humr tribe had a duty to avenge his death. In a case of a 
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Felaita killing an Agaira, all members of the Agaira section had the same obligation. This 
system was applicable regarding all segments of a tribe, including omodia, clan and 
furqan-level. In order to prevent a blood feud, the offended party could demand that the 
family or clan of the violator should pay them blood money, or dia, in order to make up 
for their loss. The rules for what the blood money payments should amount to was 
decided by the leadership of the segment which both the effected families belonged to. 
This meant that in a case of a Felaita killing an Agaira this matter would be settled by the 
Humr common leadership. However, in the case of a man killing another man from a 
neighbouring furqan of the same lineage, this would be settled by the elders of from this 
lineage. The obligations regarding blood money later became integrated and regulated as 
a part of the local administration through formally agreed on rules.133 Failure to fulfil 
these rules was a clear sign of internal friction.  
 
The organization and unity of a tribal society was largely shown in times of unrest. In 
times of conflict segments could collaborate on according to common descent on a higher 
level. Still, groups could also unite across the kinship lines. The Felaita omodias could 
for instance unite against each other, with the Metanin fighting the Awlad Serur and the 
Ziyud, the Salamat and the Jubarat joining one of the two sides.134 According to Howell, 
it also happened that an omodia could split up to support two rivalling parties in a 
conflict. Political alliances did therefore not always follow the lines of segmentation, but 
could form across the lines of kinship ties. Neighbouring omodias from different tribes 
could for example unite based on common territory and moving together through the 
seasons. Another source for alliance building was intermarriage. Marriage could this way 
be used as a mean for two groups to find unity if this would give benefits.   
 
The need for peaceful relations was strong when the tribes had to stay close to each other 
during the cultivation period and while camping near water points in the dry season. The 
fact that the Felaita, who had the opportunity to spread more than the Agaira, also had a 
long and bloody history of feuds could be an example of this. Since the boundaries 
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between the different segments were not closely defined or guarded, small groups could 
move across boundaries without much consequences. Large scale invasions were 
however resented. There was however generally few internal disputes between members 
of the Humr tribe regarding water or grazing rights. Most disputes of any importance 
affecting the Humr occurred between them other groups such as Zurug, Dinka and 
Rizeygat. 135 During the reign of Babu Nimr the Humr had good connections with the 
Ngok Dinka and this prevented any major outbursts of conflict.136 Still, some clashed 
occurred with the Malwal and Rueng Dinka who moved into Humr grazing areas in the 
south.137 
 
In 1942 the Humr and the Zurug was amalgamated into one Messiria tribe. Before the 
amalgamation all of the three factions, Agaira, Felaita, and Zurug, could be compelled to 
contribute to paying blood-money to settle a feud in case of murder, but after 1942 this 
was limited to the killer’s omodia. The agreement of common responsibility was 
essentially an admission of unity, but this unity was broken only five years later in 1947 
when the Zurug refused to pay dia. 
 
The importance of genealogy 
In the early 20th century it was generally recognized that the tribal societies of the Sudan 
who had not suffered a great deal for detribalization, was organized after a segmentary 
system where power followed the linear kinship ties on the father’s side. Members of the 
same tribe descended from a mutual ancestor and the relation grew closer as the 
segmented units became smaller. Segmentation theory and the organization of tribes in 
the Sudan, was greatly influenced by the writings of the British official Harold 
MacMichael. He started collecting information and creating genealogical overviews of 
the different tribes of Kordofan early in his official career, based on the information he 
had gathered while on trek in the district around El-Obeid.138  
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In 1912 his first book “The tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan” was published. 
Here MacMichael gave an account of the organizations of every tribe in Kordofan, which 
included also listed the subdivisions of the Humr.139 This publication was accepted as an 
authority on its field, but has later been criticized on account of its few documentary 
sources and the fact that most of it is based on interviews with local people who remained 
unidentified.140 MacMichael was instead more interested in nisbas (genealogies) which 
formed the basis of his historical judgements.  
 
The genealogies that formed the backbone of MacMichael’s studies, was based on the 
assertion that a tribes was a static unit. The tribal segments had however never been 
static, and although explained superficially in terms of kinship, the kinship pattern were 
most often only a fact within the smaller tribal segments.141 If there was a benefit to be 
gained by changing their association from one lineage to another, members of tribal 
segments would readily do this and accordingly provide a fictional link to their new 
genealogical tree to justify their transition. As seen among the Awlad Kamil a careful 
investigation of cattle brands and their distribution within the different tribal segments, 
could demonstrate how the Humr society was made up of many different 
combinations.142 
 
Howell pointed out that his investigation of genealogical trees had sometimes resulted in 
a show of opposition and statements like “Are we not all Messiria?”.143 A thorough 
investigation of tribal origin was not welcomed since the theory of common descent in 
most cases was more an ideal than actual reality. It was not to the benefit of the tribal 
members to question the validity of the kinship which their society was built upon. The 
political associations and social obligations between members of a tribe or tribal 
segments were normally an expression of kinship, and it was hence important to sustain 
the fiction of a common lineage. Any attention drawn to the fact that segments within the 
same clan or tribe differed in origin was hence resented, and the tribal members would in 
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stead provide the British inquirers with information that backed up the theory of tribal 
unity. 
 
In 1922 MacMichael published a second book regarding the tribal organisation “A 
History of the Arabs in the Sudan”, the same year as “The dual mandate in British 
tropical Africa” by F. Lugard came out. MacMichael’s book was used to provide a 
scholarly apparatus for discussion of Native Administration. In retrospect it has been 
claimed that this book was warmly received, deeply misunderstood, but probably little 
read. This book, like the former, gave massive evidence that the northern Sudanese 
“tribes” were far from static entities and in some cases not tribes at all.144 Although this 
book really reflected how families or clans created coalitions within the rural 
administration, and that authority could shift between various lineages, MacMichael and 
other members of the British administration used the book to argue the opposite, namely 
that the Sudan’s rural political organisation was stable and unchanging. In spite or the 
many flaws in his research MacMichael was largely adopted as an official historian and 
his publications from 1912 and -22 were treated as classics and not disputed.  
 
The reason behind why these publications were so greatly embraced and used as a basis 
for the structuring of Native Administration is connected to the British need for control. 
By organizing the nomadic population living in hard to reach areas, it became easier for 
the British to obtain an overview. The tribal society was structured into units which were 
considered to be static. These structures were ideal for the purpose of government and as 
the foundation for the establishment of Native Administration. The fact that different 
segments of a tribe could form alliances crossing lines of kinship, and even break away 
and become attached to another lineage, conflicted with the British way of organizing the 
tribes. In such situation the government officials would hence try to mediate between the 
quarrelling groups in order to keep the tribes unified.  
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Chapter 4: Power and administration in Dar Humr 
 
Traditional leadership and administration in early Condominium years 
The socio-political structures of the Humr tribe after arriving in Kordofan in the 18th 
century as a part of the larger Messiria group were largely influenced by rivalling tribe 
sections and shifts in power balance. In 1838 the Humr revolted against the Zurug at the 
battle of Fut, making them the masters of the Muglad region and leaving the Zurug 
leaderless after killing Sheikh Abdul Gadir Abu Agbar.145  The Humrawi leader, Ali 
Abdel Gurun of the Awlad Serur, was first able to strengthen the Felaita’s position 
among the Humr at the expense of the Agaira, but did not manage to create a stable and 
lasting administration. After his death the power shifted to the advantage of the Agaira 
who now prospered at the Felaita’s expense. Still, the descendants of the Awlad Serur 
were able to sustain their leading position among the Humr which did not please the 
Metanin, another Felaita segment who formally had held a high position among the 
Humr.146 The Awlad Serur eventually lost the battle for power among the Felaita and 
were driven out of Dar Humr around 1865. The new leader of the Felaita, Faris Saluha, 
was able to attain a ruling position and establish internal peace, although he continued to 
be pressured by outside forces. Among the Agaira Ali Messar of the Awlad Kamil 
obtained control, and by being the first to seek alliance with the Mahdi through the 
agency of his godson, he was able to preserve his leading position in the following 
years.147  
 
After the defeat of the Mahdists in 1898, the Messiria quickly came under steady 
government control.148 In 1903 it was decided by the present Governor of Kordofan, 
Miralai J. R. O’Connor that the Agaira should be chosen as the leading branch among the 
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Humr based on their two thirds population majority. Ali El-Gulla of the Awlad Kamil 
was appointed as head of the Agaira after Ali Messar had waived his claim for power on 
account of his old age and illness. This was a decision made on Inspector-General Slatin 
Pasha’s recommendation.149 One view has been that his role and the later importance of 
his descendants within the Agaira may have been founded on his family’s sudden access 
to wealth through their connection with General Gordon in the 19th century.150  
 
In the early years following the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation, the Nazir had supreme 
power among the Messiria and was not challenged by any sectional leaders. Ali El-Gulla 
was the first nazir appointed by the British government in Dar Humr, and became a very 
significant figure in Humr politics. He agreed to establish a separate nazirate for the 
Felaita and in 1915 Aris El-Mahi of the Awlad Ziada was made nazir of the Felaita, after 
having pushed Mekki Hassib of the Metanin Awlad Arifa off the throne.151  
 
The Felaita suffered more from the internal struggle for power than the Agaira in the 
earliest decades of Anglo-Egyptian rule. After having been appointed as omda of the 
Jubarat, El-Hag Agbar was able to take advantage of the unsettled situation. He was later 
elected as nazir and managed to establish a solid political position. The family of El-Hag 
Agbar obtained a similar position as the descendants of Ali El-Gulla, both becoming the 
leading branches within their tribe and remaining in power for many decades. As nazir of 
the Agaira faction Ali El-Gulla however maintained a superior position, and acted as the 
highest nazir, Nazir Umum, for the whole Humr tribe.  
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Although under official British control, the double nazirate suffered from little 
interference from the British administrators. Slave trading continued even though it 
officially had been made illegal. Ali El-Gulla was for many years able to profit on slave 
raiding because of the present confusion around the Bahr El-Arab, which was caused by 
the lack of clear division between the Humr and the Rizeygat in the area.152 A common 
problem in the Baggara regions was the rivalry between Baggara and Dinka tribes. In the 
early Condominium years the Twinj- and Malwal Dinka neighbouring the Ngok Dinka 
had been harassed by Rizeygat returning from Omdurman, at the same time as they were 
trying to resist the new government. The Ngok Dinka living closest to Dar Humr had on 
their hand been spared from many troubles by coming to terms with the Humr, and their 
leader, Kwal Arob153, having accepted the British overlords and enrolling himself in El-
Obeid as a subject of Kordofan. The Humr and the Ngok started bringing their grievances 
against each other to government officials at Nahud for settlement already in 1912, and 
their good relationship worked to prevent any serious friction in their shared areas around 
Bahr El-Arab.154 Still, some sections of the Humr kept up the slave raiding among the 
Ngok, which resulted in the Ngok seeking protection from the government after having 
initiated a more serious collaboration in 1922.155  
 
Ali El-Gulla managed to rule quite unrestrained in Dar Humr up to 1910. His continuous 
“eating” of the tribe’s wealth however made him less popular among his tribesmen and 
this developed into a desire for change. In 1911 omdas were introduced by the British 
government as an attempt to reduce the nazirs’ powers. In the absence of having another 
strong leader who could push Ali El-Gulla off the throne the opportunity to reduce his 
power through the omdas were therefore welcomed. Ali El-Gulla’s influence rapidly 
declined, and he was finally persuaded to give up his power in favour of his son Ali Nimr 
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El-Gulla who was elected as nazir of the Agaira in 1918.156 Still, after having resigned 
Ali El-Gulla tried to maintain a form of political influence and through interference with 
the dismissal and appointment of omdas of the Awlad Kamil created much trouble for Ali 
Nimr who eventually managed to settle the dispute and prevent further rivalry within the 
Agaira.157  
 
In 1924 Ali Nimr died of pneumonia. This was considered a great loss to the Agaira as 
well as the government, since he was generally regarded as a strong and honest leader. 
Gebr Ali Messar was appointed regent as Ali Nimr’s son, Babu Nimr, who was only 15 
years old and still too young to take over his father’s position. Because of his tendency to 
cause alarm within the local administration and in order to stop him from trying to attain 
power while Babu Nimr was still a minor, Ali El-Gulla was exiled to Omdurman by the 
British. In 1932 Babu Nimr was old enough to assume power. During the course of his 
nazirship he became regarded as an able and reasonable leader, qualities which, 
according to Henderson, to a large degree should be viewed as a result of the advice and 
discretion shown by the ruling men around him while growing up.158 1n 1937 the Agaira 
and the Felaita were amalgamated into one unit under the leadership of Babu Nimr, with 
El-Hag Agbar stepping down to become a wakil.159 Although the two segments were now 
united, the separate control continued. Still the amalgamation of the two segments 
functioned reasonably well with Babu Nimr as Nazir Umum of the Humr. 
  
After the establishment of the Condominium government the lineages of two Humr nazirs 
had managed to stay in power for several generations, and they were hence considered as 
royal families by the British.160 According to Babu Nimr he had not been granted the 
power to rule over the Agaira on account of the position of nazir being hereditary, but 
because of his father’s respected position among his tribesmen.161 The nazir of the Zurug, 
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Hemeida Kamis, was on the other hand described as weak by the British.162 The Native 
Administration was not strong within the Zurug tribe, and was neither expected to grow 
stronger because of its lack of royal house and permanent personnel. The central 
government viewed a unification of the Humr and the Zurug as positive and hoped that 
this would strengthen the Native Administration in the region, as well as help solve the 
Zurug’s problems regarding cattle grazing. 
 
In 1942 the Humr were amalgamated with the Zurug who was led by Nazir Hameida to 
form a united “Messiria” tribe, making Babu Nimr the overall ruler, and turning the 
nazirs of the Felaita and the Zurug into junior sectional nazirs.163 This second unification 
did not go as smoothly as the first since the question of who would fill Babu Nimr’s 
position as the leader of the Humr section became a problem to be solved. The line of 
Hag Agbar and the Metanin clan within the Felaita quarrelled over power, both trying to 
secure power through administrative positions.164 The agreement between the Humr and 
the Zurug was still viewed as a milestone in the history of the Messiria by members of 
the British administration. They saw the uniting of the segments after a century of 
dissociation as a triumph for the persuasive powers of British government officials, lead 
by Morrison165, and the statesmanship of Babu Nimr.166 The fact that Babu Nimr in 1943 
was chosen as a member of his Excellency’s Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, 
and for a short time was also a Member of Parliament, illustrated his importance as a 
member of the Native Administration and his relationship with the British government. 
Other members of his family also obtained important positions around the Muglad. 
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Establishing new leaders in Dar Humr 
The early administration of the Messiria was largely the history of strong personalities, 
such as Abdul Gadir Abu Agbar, Ali Abdel Gurun and Ali Messar. The mix of people 
who had settled in Kordofan, after having migrated eastwards in order to escape the 
dominant sultans of Bagirmi and Wadai, were believed to have been of an independent 
spirit and lacking constant political form. These immigrants, largely drawn from the 
Messiria of the west, gradually developed into one tribe with certain strong sheikhs 
gaining temporary power. The rulers were dependent on the consensus of their tribe and 
support from the heads of the lineages to be able to stay in power, and this forced them to 
limit their use of excessive power over their people. Although strong sheikhs could hold a 
lot of power for quite some time, authority had no permanent institutionalized form.  
 
The changes in authority were connected to shifting political alliances between the 
different segments. No segments had ever been permanently dominant, although the 
Messiria like other Arabs liked to idealize about their power being derived from 
hereditary rights. After the Anglo-Egyptians forces had defeated the Mahdist and 
reoccupied the Sudan, they needed to create an administration that could help them 
consolidate their position as new rulers. In the rural districts inhabited by nomadic tribes 
who had not suffered greatly from detribalization during the Mahdist years, 
administrative control was sought through establishing relationships with tribal sheiks 
who still had authority among their tribesmen. The person, family or clan who managed 
to take on a leading position in the early condominium years, were through the agency of 
the British able to preserve their role. As a result political power within the Humr tribe 
went from being shifting to becoming more stable on the highest level of administration. 
Through cooperation with the British government the appointed nazir were able to obtain 
“hereditary” rights, and leadership within the Humr developed into tribal ruling family.  
 
Although it was important for the British that an elected leader within the local 
administration had general support among his tribesmen and the ability to act as an 
authority, their choice often fell on the representative who was most willing to cooperate 
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with British administrators. This British policy was clearly shown in MacMichael’s167 
note on “The administrative policy of the Sudan government towards the Native 
Administration” in 1921: 
 
“… So long as the Sheikh remains loyal to the Government, carries its orders with 
reasonable expedition and efficiency, and retains the respect of his people, he is 
supported. If he proves himself disloyal or if from moral failure he ceases to 
retain the respect of his people, he is replaced. If he is merely inefficient he is 
given every chance and is only deposed if his failure is complete, -in which he 
would almost certainly have also lost the respect of his people…”168 
 
When it came to acquiring control over the scattered nomads in the vast areas of Sudan 
the British was hindered by the chaotic tribal system with changing relations and 
alliances. The efforts made by MacMichael to create a system and organise the different 
tribes according to their linear descent, was a way of achieving a greater overview over 
the various nomadic groups which made them easier to manage. Whether “tribes” had 
only recently emerged or had existed for some time did not matter, since the new policy 
supported superior lineages which served as focal points and worked to solidify, and 
sometimes even create, tribes. 169  By refusing to deal with individuals outside tribal 
institutions the government could provide powerful support to this process.  
 
The powers of the new nazirs were not necessarily based on previously having had a 
leading role within the tribe, which the leadership of El-Hag Agbar was an example of. 
He belonged to the Jubarate lineage within the Felaita segment, and was able to take 
advantage of the situation in the early condominium years. The dominant lineages 
holding the political authority and attracting other lineages among the Felaita had 
however been the Awlad Serur and the Metanin according to tradition. No such dominant 
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power had existed among the Agaira, even though the Awlad Kamil had been the holders 
of the nazirate since its establishment under British government.170  
 
The introduction of omodias established sectional representation, which was a new idea 
according members of the Humr tribe.171 Previously power had been restricted to “the 
sheikh” alone because the tribe was much smaller in numbers and hence more united. 
The appointment of omda was decided by the province governor based on the 
recommendation of the nazir and the district commissioner. Although the province 
governor in theory could decide on an omda without the consent of a Humr majority, this 
was rarely a preferred solution.172 In general the Baggara aspirations of this kind were too 
strong to be ignored by the British officials. However, the rivalry between the different 
factions of an omodia made it difficult to settle on a common candidate. This continued 
to be a problem after the introduction of Native Administration.  
 
Power balance and tribal unity 
If an omda was to be elected, a council meeting between all the clan leaders was called. 
The different clans of one omodia instantly split into different factions with some clans 
forming alliances, in order to promote their own favoured representatives. Agreement 
around one candidate was only reached after hours of debate, compromise and promises 
of future agreements. The process of deciding on one candidate often entailed that the 
clan members committed to follow a plan which in theory secured a representation of all 
the factions: A member of clan A could be chosen the first time if it was agreed that a 
member of clan B was to be elected the next time, and so on a member of clan C was to 
be favoured in the following election. Agreements such as this were however often 
disrupted by the fact that one or more lineages claimed hereditary rights, and refused to 
agree to give up power.  
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Once having obtained power, many omdas resented following the rules and regulations 
laid down by the central government. The omdas powers were weakened by the fact that 
their position was not hereditary like the title of nazir. The British could chose to remove 
an omda who had taken advantage of his powers for his own personal benefit and acted 
contrary to the government’s desires. Local sheikhs were often labelled by British 
officials as irresponsible drunks, and reported of sheiks ordering flogging and beating of 
tribal members in order to extort money or express their power. In many cases other 
members of the tribe would direct a complaint to the British local officials in order for 
them to take action. It was also common that clans rivalling to the lineage of the ruling 
omda could form conspiracies against him based on old antagonism and their own 
aspiration to rule.173 The omda’s dependency on his electors largely prevented him from 
taking advantage of his power. A traditional Humr ceremony described how a local 
representative before an election was reminded of his place. By beating him with grass 
and twigs he was praised good luck, but at the same time reminded that although he as 
leader and may not be beaten like a common man he could very well fall from his ruling 
position if acting unjust, and become a common man again.174  
 
In Howell’s opinion the process of shifting omdas had more or less developed into a 
political institution. The events after electing an omda follow a fixed set of events; a man 
was appointed omda, but after a while lost his grip on his electors and becomes 
unpopular. Both true and false accusations were then raised against him and he became 
discredited and finally sacked. This left the position open for his rivals who had 
engineered the process to try and fill it with a candidate of their own. The rivalry within 
the Awlad Kamil omodia of the Agaira gave a good example of how clans could argue 
over the right to administrative power.175 After having elected and later sacked a member 
of the Dar Mota clan, a member of the Dar Salim was appointed as omda. Both 
representatives were resented by the Dar Um Sheiba based on the fact that they 
themselves had held the omodia several times before and therefore saw it as their right. 
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The Dar Um Sheiba later allied with the Kelabna to secure that one of their clan members 
an administrative position, while the other Awlad Kamil clans united to elect their own. 
Agreements regarding blood-money payments between the different clans were also 
broken.  
 
Sir Douglas Newbold remarked on the difficulty of settling on nazirs and omdas among 
the Messiria after having attended several council meetings and witnessed numerous and 
long lasting discussions.176 He had reached the conclusion that the best way to act in 
order to make the processes more efficient, was to implement a stronger line and let the 
nazir and the British representatives of the district administration decide on which omda 
to elect unless the tribal council was able to come to a conclusion within a set time limit. 
Newbold had settled on this opinion after having failed while trying other methods 
against the disagreements, these being persuasion, dividing omodias and splitting the 
areas of the conflicting sheikhs among different omodias.  
 
Henderson also remarked on the powers of the omdas and pointed out that the creation of 
omdas among the Baggara tribes had not been an entirely success.177 The intention of 
establishing omdas in 1911 had been to check on the nazirs, but this was after a while 
considered undesirable. The elected omdas were weak and harmless and acted more or 
less as puppets of their people. As soon as they tried to function as effective assistants to 
the government in collecting taxes or general administration, they were agitated against. 
The question of how the omdas should receive compensation for the expenses that 
followed the responsibilities of their office, such as showing hospitality towards their 
tribesmen, caused another problem for the British. If the omdas were given salaried this 
lead to a rush of clients seeking to get a piece of the wealth, and at the same time the 
competition over the omdas position would become stronger. On the other hand if the 
British let the omdas “eat” the fines they collected through their powers of their office, 
they were accused of extortion and protested against. This led Henderson to conclude that 
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the omdas’ only real function was to divert the local political intrigues away from the 
nazir.  
 
In order to uphold the significance of the Native Administration it was important to 
balance the power of the tribal leadership. While strong sheiks were controlled the British 
tried to guide the weaker sheikhs, without any of them loosing too much prestige in front 
of their own tribe.178 The government continued to suspend, remove, and replace tribal 
sheikhs, but could not as easily remove actors on a higher level of administration since a 
stable leadership was important to be able to maintain a functioning administration. 
Interference from the British was carried out with the intentions of causing as little 
disturbance as possible and new leaders were therefore often of the same family as the 
old, and could be a brother or a son. The government’s promoting of a family or 
individual and dealing with others through it in this way strengthened the tendency to re-
establish the old tribal structures and could create clans where there before only had been 
loosely associated groups.  
 
It was not uncommon that quarrels between different segments could lead to clans 
wanting to break away from the main body of the tribe. Because of the shifting leadership 
on the lower levels of administration and the many quarrels over power, clans every now 
and again wanted to break away from their omodias. Still, these separations were usually 
only temporary, and in most cases Humr clans who broke away would return.179 The fear 
of social and political disintegration drove members of the larger tribal segment to try and 
persuade the out breaking section to return by using mediators and offering a sum of 
money or camels as means for reconciliation. As a result the Humr omodias stayed more 
or less the same.  
 
The Dar Um Sheiba clan, who initially wanted to break away from the Awlad Kamil after 
a member of the Dar Salima had been elected as new omda through a majority vote, later 
regretted their decision to leave and wanted to make peace and rejoin the larger section. 
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Although the Dar Um Sheiba did not admit to have been wrong, they resented the 
members of their own clan who had acted badly during the conflict and wanted to 
exclude these from the tribe in order to restore a good relationship with the other clans. 
Nevertheless, the Dar Um Sheiba clan did not admit to having any guilt in arousing the 
conflict, but instead wanted the other clans of the Awlad Kamil to pay them a sum of 
money in admission of guilt.180  
 
By shaping Native Administration to fit the organization of the tribe into segments, the 
British regarded these segments as static units. Shifting alliances within the tribe and 
outbreak of certain units therefore conflicted with the central governments desire for 
stability. Still, the larger segments of the tribes were generally stabile enough for the 
administration to function, and even though some segments might break away, they 
would more often than not rejoin their original group. It was more common that smaller 
segments would become affiliated to a new lineage, but this had little effect on the 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
 
When analysing the political behaviour and structures of the Humr tribe, many aspects fit 
the description of an agnatic-segmentary society. This way of organizing a society is 
based on the notion that power follows the lines of patrilineal decent, implying that a son 
would inherit the powers of his father and that several sons would form different 
branches of one lineage. A lineage consists of autonomous and equal segments which are 
politically integrated. These segments act as cooperative groups in situations such as 
tribal conflicts, uniting on various levels depending on the extent of the conflict.181 An 
important question is nevertheless whether or not the agnatic-segmentary model is an 
optimal tool for fully understanding the political structures of the Humr society. Can 
other analytical models be applied to analyse the political organization of the tribe? And 
if so, do these give a more accurate description of the mechanisms which can lead to 
shifts in power balance and the alliance building between different tribal segments? 
Which model is most useful in order to observe the consequences of the Anglo-Egyptian 
regime’s introduction of Native Administration, and can it help us detect whether or not 
this lead to any socio-political changes in the Humr society?   
 
In the following chapter I will try to answer these four questions through comparing the 
qualities of the agnatic-segmentary model with the patron-client and the elitist models, 
which have been used to analyse the process of establishing a local administration among 
the Bideiriya and the Kababish tribes living in other regions of Kordofan. By doing this I 
must also view in what way the Humr are similar or differ from these tribal societies.  
 
The agnatic-segmentary model 
The agnatic-segmentary model has previously been used by Ian Cunnison in his 
anthropological study of the Humr tribe. This model fitted the functionalist approach that 
had influenced the earliest research done by anthropologists on tribal societies in 
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Africa.182 Viewing the Humr in light of this model, the tribe is classified to fit this 
structure and leadership and political power is explained as a result of linear descent. 
Many features of the Humr society fits the form of the agnatic-segmentary model; the 
geographical distribution of the omodias and clans, the migration pattern and camp 
settlement according to lineages, the sharing of cattle brands and drum calls according to 
segment, economic cooperation between closely related groups, marriage arrangements 
and the settlement of feuds with the transaction of blood money.183 The validity of the 
agnatic-segmentary theory was strengthened by the British government’s integration of 
the tribal linear system in the new local administration through establishing omodias and 
choosing tribal leaders to serve as omdas and nazirs. 
 
On the other hand the agnatic-segmentary model has several weaknesses which make it 
inadequate in order to fully explain the political organization of the Humr tribe, a fact that 
Cunnison himself pointed out.184 First of all an agnatic-segmentary society is based on a 
system of autonomous segments which join together and cooperate on different levels 
according to the various circumstances. This structure conflicts with the idea of having a 
superior leader who rules over a segment or sub-segment as a whole, since this entails 
that one of the members of a segment has to rule over his peers. In the case of the Humr 
this would for instance mean that the appointment of Babu Nimr as leader of the whole 
Humr tribe diverges with the idea of the Felaita and the Agaira segments being 
autonomous entities.  
 
Secondly the agnatic-segmentary model implies that the tribe consisted of stable lineage 
segments which could function as political units. In reality the different factions within 
the Humr often formed alliances based on their own interests, crossing the traditional 
lines of linear descent. The example of the Dar Um Sheiba and the Kelabna clans allying 
against the other clans within the Awlad Kamil in order to secure the position of omda, 
therefore conflicts with the theory of the model.185 Alliances between neighbouring feriqs 
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formed on the basis of common interests, but who according to lineage belongs to 
different segments, is another example of this.  
 
Cunnison found it strange that the members of the Humr tribe themselves to a large 
degree emphasized the patrilineal system, if it was so obvious that alliances were formed 
despite this.186 He felt that the agnatic-segmentary model did not have the necessary 
flexibility to be a model for political actions. Based on this he came to the conclusion that 
even if the model did not fit the reality of Humr life, the ideology was sustained by the 
tribesmen because it created order in the genealogical chaos and the continuous political 
shifts. In this way a stronger feeling of continuity was created, and at the same time all 
members of society were included. According to Cunnison the value of the system was 
demonstrated through the fact that leaders of the mid-level segments without any real 
official authority or any practical tribal functions were sustained. 
 
The patron-client model 
Because of the many weaknesses of the agnatic-segmentary model, alternative models 
may be more useful in order to understand the socio-political structures and dynamics in 
the Humr society. One alternative is the patron-client model which has previously been 
used by Ahmed Abu Shouk for analysing the introduction of Native Administration 
among the Bideiriya tribe in central Kordofan. This model is based on a mutual 
dependent relationship between a weak and a stronger part that creates a vertical 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled.187 The strong patron offers protection and 
support, which is often of a financial character, to the weaker client who in exchange 
promises to perform duties or to follow certain rules laid out by the patron. In a society 
based on patron-client relations it is common for one patron to have many clients. The 
patron therefore has the opportunity to influence and exercise power over those who are 
dependant on him in order to obtain high positions within a community.  
 
                                                 
186
 Cunnison 1966: 192 
187
 Meyer 1998 
68 
 
According to Abu Shouk, the patron-client relationship could be seen on three levels of 
the administration in Dar Bideiriya; between the central government and the members of 
Native Administration, between the members of the Native Administration within one 
nazirate (meaning the relationship between the nazir, the omdas and the village sheiks), 
and between the local leadership and the village people. These patron-client relationships 
must be viewed as a control mechanism which evolved under Native Administration, 
rather than a type of political system.188 Can similar patron-client relationships also be 
detected within the Humr tribe? In order to evaluate this, a comparative study of the 
Humr and the Bideiriya tribe is necessary.  
 
In pre-colonial times the Bideiriya, like the Humr, were lead by a sheikh who was 
responsible for the protection of the land against cattle raids, and taking care of intra-
tribal relations as well as the Bideiriya’s connection with other tribes. The sheik’s powers 
and his relationship with the leaders of the dominant lineages within the tribe were not 
regulated by any formal structures, but were based largely upon mutual interest. This 
meant that the sheikh had no real powers of coercion to back his decisions, and this made 
him dependent on the cooperation of the other tribal members. A good leader would 
therefore need to have persuasive and negotiating skills in order to sustain his position. A 
leader also had to offer leadership, support and access to resources. In return he was 
given political support, but also other forms of assistance. Like within the Humr, groups 
could break away and join other neighbouring segments in periods with weak leadership 
and limited tribal unity.  
 
Because of this, and the fact that every household within Dar Bideiriya had free access to 
pasture, water, land and gum trees, Abu Shouk regarded the tribe as a flexible political 
entity at that time rather than a static body.189 Still, the ideology of descent was an 
important political factor among the Bideiriya since a tribe could act as a centre of power 
and claim its right over economic resources. Such a centre would naturally attract 
followers, or clients, given that these would be able to benefit from the wealth and 
                                                 
188
 Abu Shouk 1997: 4 
189
 Abu Shouk 1997: 46 
69 
 
protection of the tribe. New followers would adjust their genealogical associations in 
order to be connected to the dominant tribe. Descent could hence be viewed as a source 
for maintaining political integration and establishing collective obligations among 
members of a tribe. 
 
The socio-political structures of the Bideiriya in pre-colonial times in other words clearly 
resembled those of the Humr. However, there were certain aspects which separated the 
tribes and influenced how they were integrated in the local administration set up by the 
British government after the reoccupation. Before the Mahdist revolution in the late 19th 
century, both the Humr and the Bideiriya were largely dependent on cattle and a nomadic 
lifestyle. During the Mahdist years the political structure of the tribal organisation was 
broken up, and tribal members were dispersed or relocated as members of the Mahdist 
army. After the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation the tribal members began returning home. 
The tribes of central Kordofan were resettled in villages with little regard to their tribal 
affiliation. This created a mosaic of tribes which undermined the tribal structure based on 
agnatic-segmentary bonds. 190  The Bideiriya were forced to settle down and become 
sedentary farmers on account of having lost most their herds during the Mahdia. The 
villages were established as independent units with political authorities and economic 
recourses attached to them, replacing the traditional political structures which had 
previously been connected to the ideology of descent.  
 
The Humr on the other hand did not suffer as much from detribalization as the Bideiriya. 
After the overthrow of the Mahdists they started returning to their homeland and 
rebuilding their herds in order to continue their nomadic way of life. One of the obvious 
reasons for the different development among the two tribes was that Dar Bideiriya was 
closer geographically to the province centre and therefore much easier for the new rulers 
to reach and control. The Humr inhabited a much vaster and less accessible area, and 
their annual migrations made them even harder to get to.  
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The dynamic characteristic of a tribe conflicted with the British desire for order and 
control after the reoccupation. This had different outcomes within the Humr and the 
Bideiriya tribes. The attempt to map the tribes of the Sudan in the early 20th century lead 
by Harold MacMichael sought to create order among the fluctuating segments and 
“locking” them in specific positions to form stable units which fitted an administrative 
purpose. The Humr was integrated in the local administration based on a tribal 
hierarchical structure, with the large segments becoming omodias and tribal leaders being 
confirmed in their ruling positions. However, in the case of the Bideiriya the British 
disregarded the political value of descent, and instead focused on establishing ruling 
families who derived their power from the support of the state. Abu Shouk feels that 
undermining the traditional concept of leadership in Dar Bideiriya proves that the British 
was not really interested in resuscitating the old tribal system, but rather the benefits of 
using it for administrative purposes. 191  The new local administration was heavily 
dependent on the central government, and this gave the state access to decision-making 
within local Bideiriya politics and created a strong patron-client bond. 
 
Patron-client relations between the British and the Humr leadership 
Is it possible to detect patron-client bonds on the same three levels of administration 
within Dar Humr as Abu Shouk describes in the case of the Bideiriya? To analyse this I 
will start by looking at the relationship between the tribal leaders of the Humr and the 
central government. After the Anglo-Egyptian forces reached Dar Humr, the Agaira was 
chosen as the leading branch of the tribe based on their majority in the population. In 
1903 Ali El-Gulla became appointed as leader of the Agaira, a decision largely based on 
the personal relationship between Ali El-Gulla and Slatin Pasha, who had a prominent 
position within the government. This created a bond between the British rulers and the 
local leadership within Dar Humr, but did not necessarily imply any strong patron-client 
relations. The continuous slave raiding in Dinka territory which was condemned by the 
government demonstrates this.192  
                                                 
191
 Abu Shouk 1997: 73 
192




Ali El-Gulla’s ability to continue ruling more or less unstrained until 1910 suggestion 
that he was not very dominated by the central government. During the first decade of 
Anglo-Egyptian government administrative units were set up in the districts with 
representatives of the central powers. In Dar Humr a mamur and 15 policemen were 
stationed at Muglad during the wet season, and the British inspector rarely visited the 
region more than twice a year. This force was not a large enough to establish a steady 
control in the region and take over the role of the Agaira and Felaita nazirs. Ali El-
Gulla’s position was not significantly weakened until omdas were appointed and given 
administrative assignments such as the assessment or collection of herd tax in 1911. In 
the early condominium years the British had not yet established an administration that 
could reach the remote regions of Kordofan, and therefore lacked the ability to employ 
much force away from the ruling centres. This made it difficult to regulate the actions of 
the nazir or his urge to “eat” taxes, and to build up strong patron-client relationships, 
between the nazirs and the central government. 
 
The members of the Humr tribe lacked the ability to remove Ali El-Gulla as nazir 
although his exploitations made him unpopular. This might be an indication that his links 
to the central government helped strengthen his position although the British were not 
fully pleased with his actions. On the other hand his ability to remain in power might just 
be a result of his personal leading qualities favoured by the tribal members. An unpopular 
sheikh would traditionally lose power if he lost the support of his clients, at the same time 
as a client would lose the benefit of being connected to a strong leader if he chose to free 
himself of their bonds. Howell points out that there were no strong candidate to push Ali 
El-Gulla off the throne, and this could also have been a reason behind him staying in 
power for so long.  
 
The British support of the Humr nazirs was shown in 1939 when members of the Awlad 
Kamil section who opposed the descendants of Ali Gulla’s claim for power was 
imprisoned by British province officials.193 This incident was described by J. Robertson 
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the current District Commissioner in Western Kordofan. His relationship with Babu Nimr 
was described as a very good relationship based on mutual respect and friendship by 
Babu Nimr himself who generally refers to the British as gentle rulers who did impose 
their decisions on the Humr.194 This description of the relationship between the Humr 
leadership and the British officials might be an indication of the British general manner 
of governing in the nomadic areas, but might also just be an illustration of the position of 
Babu Nimr and his special relationship with the British. 
 
In 1934 the Bideiriya omodia were transformed to a nazirate with Sheikh Husayn Zaki 
El-Din being appointed nazir after previously having held the title of the highest omda, or 
omda umum. The main motive behind this was to consolidate the position of the leading 
family favoured by the British. The office of omda umum had no hereditary status, while 
the Nazir authority was “based on the recognition of his hereditary right, or claim, to the 
position by fellow tribesmen”.195   The British government in this way chose Sheikh 
Husayn before other families who claimed their right to power and through making him 
the strongest political authority in the district a strong patron-client tie was established.  
In Dar Humr the position of nazir was not formally made hereditary, but in reality this 
was the case. The two leading lineages of the Agaira and the Felaita remained in power 
from having been chosen as rulers in the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian period.  
 
After Ali El-Gulla resigned, the power was passed on to members of his lineage, and 
through them the administrative powers within the Agaira, and later the Humr tribe as a 
whole was consolidated. Although the attempt to amalgamate the Humr and the Zurug 
under a joined leadership failed after only a few years, the establishment of a stable 
leadership within Dar Humr was as a success. The Agaira and the Felaita sections were 
lead by the descendents of El-Hag Agbar and Ali El-Gulla, who was able to preserve the 
power rarely challenged by rivalling lineages seeking powers. Their positions were 
secured by a good relationship with the British as their patrons. This relationship was 
beneficial for both parties. By keeping their clients satisfied and offering them lucrative 
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positions and the powers to rule over their own tribesmen, the British gained the support 
of the tribal leaders who also took care of the practical administrative tasks in the districts 
and made sure that the rules and regulations laid down by the central government were 
followed.  
 
Patron-client bonds within the Humr tribe 
Is it also possible to detect patron-client bonds between the nazirs and the lower sectional 
leaders within Dar Humr? In Dar Bideiriya the nazir had the power to appoint and 
dismiss the omdas, which in reality gave the nazir ability to choose omdas who were 
supportive of him.196 This established a relatively strong patron-client relationship within 
the nazirate where loyal clients were rewarded with administrative positions including 
prestige, economic advantages and other benefits. The omdas of the Humr tribe were 
officially appointed by British officials according to the nazirs’ recommendations. This 
decision was however largely overshadowed by the desires of the different tribal lineages 
which competed for the position. Compared to the Bideiriya, the Humr nazirs’ were less 
influential in the election of omdas which weakened the patron-client bonds. 
 
Leadership on the lower levels was shifting and Howell points out that the election 
process could to a certain degree be called democratic.197 This however created a very 
unstable situation, with constant fights over power and discontinuing administration. The 
omodias were distinct groups and because rivalry between them was common, they 
seldom were able to form alliances in order to remove the nazir. This indicated that the 
inability to decide each others positions was mutual both from the nazirs’ and omdas’ 
perspective. Still, the tradition of clients resenting to support a leader that was 
incompetent seemed to have remained strong among the Humr, and this influenced the 
patron’s aspirations to keep his clients happy. This was underlined by Babu Nimr who 
claimed that the respect he got from his tribesmen was based mutual cooperation, good 
relations and mutual courtesies between him and his people.198 
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The differences between the Humr and the Bideiriya made it easier for the sectional 
leaders of the Humr tribe to maintain a strong position within the tribal leadership. While 
the Bideiriya had become sedentary and the nazir were given control over the recourses, 
the Humr maintained their lifestyle as pastoral nomads. The annual migrations in bodies 
according to clans made it more difficult for the nazirs to maintain absolute control the 
year around. The lack of controllable resources also strengthened the omdas position. A 
Humrawi had generally independent control of the number of cattle in his herd. Cattle 
were also an unstable value since cattle plagues were a constant threat and could reduce a 
herd drastically over a short period of time. There existed no rules regarding ownership 
for grazing and agricultural land, although certain feriqs could claim the right to grow 
crops on a chosen piece of land for a period of time. 
 
The important resources within the Bideiriya tribe was however land rights and the 
access to gum tree gardens. After the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation the new regime had 
declared itself the owner of the tribal lands in Kordofan by rights of conquest. In Dar 
Bideiriya the local leadership was recognized as the trustees of the resources and the 
nazir was made responsible for distributing these rights downward within the local 
administration. The only controllable resource of any value among the Humr were the 
access to water points which might be exploited by leadership. In the dry periods 
members of the administration could claim the rights to natural of constructed watering 
point that the nomads gathered around for a period of time. By deciding who should first 
be granted access to these, a local omda or sheikh could strengthen his role as patron.  
This affected the relationship between the tribe and the members of the administration 
more than it influenced the bonds between the members of Native Administration. 
 
The powers of the nazirs were consolidated through establishing institutionalized courts. 
The local leadership drew their powers and jurisdiction from the state, rather than relying 
on the support and consent of their lineages. The court system helped strengthen the 
patron-client ties on all three levels. The villagers were judged by the local administrators 
and the system of appeal made it possible for the nazir to control the omdas, while the 
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decisions made by the nazirs could again be monitored and overruled by the central 
government. These relations were expressed through clients staying loyal to their patron’s 
desires in order to maintain their judicial roles. Abu Shouk views the local courts as a 
factor behind the dissolving of the old tribal system, since this gathered more power on 
the top and made it easier to control the local actors.199  
 
The rivalry concerning the position of omdas shows how the elected representatives of 
the Humr tribe were not safe in their positions. The omdas were more dependent on the 
tribe since an exploitation of power always lead to him being removed. This indicates 
that the patron-client ties in Dar Humr were weaker on the levels below the top. The 
tribal customs which were still important in Dar Humr had been largely broken down 
among the Bideiriya. The villagers in Dar Bideiriya had to a larger degree become clients 
dependent on the village sheiks, since these were given the authority to collect taxes and 
administer the resources. The Humr on the other hand was independent of the tribal 
leadership in order to maintain his pastoral lifestyle and was hence more free that the 
Bideiriya.  
 
On the other hand patron-client bonds could be established between a Humrawi seeking 
the patronage of a stronger tribal member. The position of patron was in this regard 
closely related to the number of cattle a man possessed since this made him more able to 
help his clients financially by lending or giving them a cow. In return for the financial 
assistance, the patron could expect his clients to support him. A man who attracted many 
clients would strengthen his position within his lineage and this would also influence his 
ability to attain political influence. But like the leaders on the higher level of Humr 
society his powers were dependent on him being able to stay popular among his clients 
through acting in accordance with the clients’ general wishes. If not the clients could 
break away and seek the patronage of another leader. This made the patron-client bonds 
more fragile and made it harder for the leader to use excessive force. Still, we see that 
major lineages such as clans often returned to their omodia after a while after action had 
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been taken to mediate between the disagreeing parties.200 Smaller lineages however were 
more likely to become permanently attached to a new segment. 
 
The elitist model 
An elitist model used by Talal Asad in his studies of the Kababish represents a third 
analytical approach to viewing the socio-political structures of a nomad tribe in 
Kordofan. This model assumes that leadership is limited within a small group of society 
favoured by birth or social position. The Kababish were camel nomads living in the 
northern regions of the province and in many ways differed form both the Bideiriya and 
the Humr. Their administration was built up around the leadership of Ali El-Tom.201 Ali 
El-Tom had been appointed nazir by the government in the early Condominium years, 
and his powers and authority was based on his control of the highly centralised 
administrative hierarchy. All the higher offices within the Kababish administration were 
held by the small Awlad Fadlallah lineage which consisted of Ali El-Tom’s agnatic first 
cousins and their offspring. This in reality resulted in a monopolisation of the political 
power concentrated in the hands of the tribes leading elite.202  
 
Administrative power was given to sectional sheikhs who acted as tax-collectors and as 
communicators between the Nazir and his tribesmen. Although the office of the sectional 
sheikh was prestigious and lucrative, his wealth or status was not adequate in order to 
exercise any real political power or heighten his personal authority.203 This meant that he 
did not have the legitimate powers to enforce his power, but was backed by the coercive 
force wielded by superior officials. The elitist model viewed the Kababish in light of 
being governed by the Awlad Fadlallah lineage as the dominant decision-making group. 
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The fact that all outside this lineage was prohibited from attaining any political authority 
makes it reasonable to regard this as a society build on elitist structures. 
 
Talal Asad pointed out that patron-client relations did exist within the Kababish society, 
but only between members of the Awlad Fadlallah being the patrons, and non-Awlad 
Fadlallah who were the clients.204 Like among the Humr the unity of the Kababish was 
based on the ideology of kinship though agnatic descent and the tribal segments were 
organized according to closeness of lineage. Clients were however not organized in 
lineages of their own, but remained loyal to their patron as individuals and supporting 
him both morally and physically. The patron-client relationships described by Asad did in 
this manner differ from the clientelist structures that characterized the Bideiriya society.  
 
The socio-political structures of the Kababish also contrasted those of the Humr with 
regard to consent of leadership. Even though individual Kababish could consider the 
tribal leadership as legitimate and accepted political the decisions made by them, consent 
was not needed. Consent was according to Asad only present when people had the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, a possibility which did not 
exist within the Kababish tribe since the Awlad Fadlallah were the only lineage with 
political power.205 Among the Humr consent of the tribal members was still important for 
the leadership to be able to maintain his position. This was especially visible with regard 
of the position of omda, which shifted regularly between different lineages based on the 
omda’s subjects being displeased with his actions.  
 
The highest positions among the Humr had become consolidated in the hands of the 
families of Ali El-Gulla and El-Hag Agbar, and in many ways resembled the tribal 
leadership of the Kababish. Still, it is not adequate to analyse the Humr in light of the 
elitist model since it was possible for members of other lineages than the ruling families 
to attain political powers on the lower levels.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Changing socio-political structures? 
Did the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation of the Sudan in 1898 and the establishment of a 
Native Administration have an impact on the socio-political structures in Dar Humr? It is 
clear that the British influenced the political organization on the highest levels of Humr 
society by consolidating the powers within lineages that was willing to cooperate with the 
central government, and in this way creating “royal families”. Abu Shouk and Cunnison 
both agree that the central powers after the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation played a role in 
reorganizing the socio-political structure in tribal societies, and according to Cunnison 
this was particularly done through establishing offices over the tribe.  
 
My study of the Humr has however shown that the British took advantage of already 
existing tribal structures in order to shape the local administration. By choosing tribal 
sheikhs who already had a leading position within their tribe, it was easier for the new 
government to legitimize the administrative system. Native Administration was therefore 
based on the tribal hierarchy that had shaped the Humr society before the interruption of 
the Mahdia. The appointment of local leaders by British officials did not necessarily 
reflect the traditional division of power within the tribe. In the case of the Felaita power 
were put in the hands of men who had not been among the traditional leaders of the 
section. The British was free to choose any family among the tribes who was willing to 
support the government and act according to its wishes, if this family could muster a 
minimum of political support from their tribesmen. 
 
The work done by Harold MacMichael in order to organize the tribes of Sudan was a 
useful tool for the British, although an evaluation of the theories shows that they were 
incompatible with reality. It has been claimed that the Humr originally consisted of 
mobile and fluid groups who prior to the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation formed and 
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dissolved in relation to internal conflicts and clashes regarding neighbouring tribes.206 In 
Nicole Grandin’s opinion the Humr never formed a compact group before the 
Condominium period, and that the power did not follow any rules of decent with tribal 
leaders only having a function in times of conflict and unrest. She regards the fluidity of 
the smaller tribal segments as defining for the structure of the whole tribe.  
 
Even though the structures of the Humr tribe might not have been as rigid as assumed by 
the British government, my study has shown that there existed a structure static enough to 
construct the foundations of a tribal society. Some segments could break away from the 
larger groups for short periods with political disagreements often cutting across the 
boundaries or other groupings explained by a common genealogical descent. The tribe 
was still generally quite stable when it came to maintaining a unified social structure. 
This explains the British government’s use of the tribal organisation for administrative 
purposes. This implicates that although the government in some cases could have revived 
the segmentary structure and reinforced its hierarchy based on kinship ties, and also in 
some cases constructing such a hierarchy in societies largely influenced by 
detribalization, they did not create the tribal society which Native Administration was 
founded on. In order for the local administration to function, it had to be based on the 
leadership of sheiks who already had a legitimate position and was supported by many 
clients.  
 
The introduction of Native Administration affected the Humr trough altering the balance 
between the segments. The new administrative organisation raised some of the major 
lineages to become omodias, while others were organized under other omodias. The same 
process also took place regarding the smaller segments of the tribe with the British 
understanding of the tribe’s genealogy defining the segments’ positions. In Cunnison’s 
opinion the new administrative system undermined the traditional social and political 
structures and created å shift in the power balance since an absence of established power 
positions were needed in order to preserve the agnatic-segmentary system.207 The study 
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of the Humr has however shown that the tribal society was not merely based on agnatic-
segmentary structures. Lineage does not explain the political reality of the Humr, but 
stands as a part of it. Regarding the Humr in light of a patron-client model it is possible to 
detect such bonds existing both before and after the introduction of Native 
Administration. 
 
Even though the nomadic pastoralists of the Humr tribe did not become as dominated by 
patron-client relations as the sedentary Bideiriya, such bonds existed on several levels of 
the tribal society. The British central government supporting the appointed members of 
the tribal administration by giving them the powers to rule over their tribesmen and 
establishing local tribal courts strengthened the patron-client bonds. The Humr’s nomadic 
way of life and the common access to resources on the other hand weakened these bonds. 
The Humr differed from the Bideiriya since the patron-client bonds did not have an 
equally strong effect on the tribe as a whole, but were strongest on the highest and lowest 
levels of the tribal society. The power struggle and frequent shifts regarding the position 
of omda shows how these bonds were weaker on the mid-levels of the tribal 
administration. The power balance between the nazirs and the British government had 
many characteristics resembling a patron-client relationship, but these bonds weakened 
downwards through the administrational hierarchy. Still, wealthy men owning a large 
herd were able to attract many clients on the lowest tribal levels.  
 
Summing up 
My study of the Humr tribe has shown that socio-political changes did occur based on the 
influence of the Anglo-Egyptian rule and the introduction of Native Administration. In 
order to fully understand the dynamics of the Humr tribe it is not sufficient to apply one 
of the analytical models, but it must be viewed in light of both the patron-client and the 
agnatic-segmentary model. The establishment of patron-client bonds on the highest 
political levels of the Humr society and a consolidation of the ruling powers represents 
one of the most significant changes that happened as a result of British interference. 
However patron-client relations had existed within the smaller segments also before 
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Anglo-Egyptian times. While leadership on the highest levels of administration was 
dependent on pleasing the central government, leadership on the lower levels of the tribal 
society was still dependent on the consensus of the tribe. It is hence reasonable to 
conclude that Native Administration had a more significant effect on the socio-political 
structures of the Humr tribe on a higher level. 
 
The ideology of common descent was sustained by the tribesmen because it created order 
in the genealogical chaos and the continuous political shifts. This helped create a unity 
which the economic and political cooperation within the smaller tribal segments was 
largely based on. The British rulers also influenced the socio-political structures of the 
Humr by trying to keep the tribal segments more stabile since the rigidness of Native 
Administration had no room for segments breaking away from the ruling authority and 
become an independent political entity or attaching themselves to other tribal groups. But 
like in the case of stabilising the political power, this had little effect on the smallest 
tribal units, but rather affected the Humr on the highest levels of administration. 
 
Post script: Looking ahead - The Abyei conflict and Sudan’s opportunity for peace 
The south-western corner of Kordofan still is an area of conflict that requires attention, 
and this was one of the reasons why I found it interesting to focus on this region in my 
master thesis. Today the Messiria nomads find themselves living on the border that 
divides the Sudan into a northern and southern region. Inhabiting an area with scarce 
resources and at times a harsh environment lying so close to the much different Dinka 
tribes further south, the fight over land rights has been an important source of conflict.  
 
The hostile relationship between Baggara Arabs and Dinka has existed for centuries with 
a history of the Baggara raiding the Dinka territory for the purpose of slave trade in the 
19th century. With the degree of instability varying through different periods of time with 
more or less stability and peace in the region, the conflict was again fuelled by the civil 
wars in the 20th century and the arming of the two parties as means to fight for the 
government and the revolting groups. The discovery of oil in the Abyei region has also 
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been an important factor that enhances the government’s interest in securing land rights. 
The unsteady situation in the area continues to be a cause for concern, and bloody clashes 
between the Messeria and the Dinka remain a problem. 
 
In January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the 
government of Sudan and SPLM/A. Here they agreed upon the establishment of an Abyei 
Boundary Commission (ABC) which was intended to settle upon a just border between 
the Dinka and the Messiria based on scientific analysis and research. This meant 
interviewing representatives from both parties and consult relevant sources from British 
and Sudanese archives. The ABC conducted their research from April to July 2005. Their 
conclusions were published in the ABC report which was officially and formally 
presented to the Presidency of the Government of National Unity of the Republic of 
Sudan on 14 July 2005.208 The ABC’s decision, which according to the CPA were to be 
final and binding, was not respected by the leadership of the National Congress Party 
headed by President Bashir, who claimed that the experts of the Abyei Boundary 
Commission had acted in a manner that was beyond their mandate. As a result there have 
recently been more fights in the region. The matter has now been taken to the 
International Court of Arbitration in The Hague. As the situations remains today the 
conflict between the Messiria and the Dinka in southern Kordofan could prove to be the 
Achilles heel of the CPA, influencing not only the people of the Abyei region, but the 
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Appendix 1: Governors of Kordofan 1900-1955 
1900-1903 B. T. Mahon 
1903-1907 J. R. O’Connel 
1908  H. D. W. Loyd 
1909-1917 R. V. Savil 
1917-1922 J. W. Sagar 
1922-1926 J. D. Craig 
1926-1928 Sarsfield-Hall 
1928-1932 J. A. Gillan 
1933-1938 D. Newbold 
1938-1947 E. Campell 
1947-1948 J. F. Tiernay 
1949-1950 D. Cummings 
1950-1954 G. Hawkensworth 














Appendix 2: Abstract in Norwegian 
 
Indirekte styre innen Humr-stammen i Sudan 
Skiftende lederskap og sosiopolitiske strukturer i et stammesamfunn 
1900-1940 
 
I 1898 vant de Anglo-egyptiske styrkene over det revolusjonære mahdist-regimet og 
overtok med dette over makten i Sudan. De to første tiårene var preget av en direkte 
styreform, men britenes gryende mistenksomhet ovenfor egyptisk nasjonalisme, samt et 
ønsket om å redusere administrative utgifter, fremmet et ønske om en administrativ 
omlegging. En innføring av et indirekte styre ble ansett som gunstig og en rekke reformer 
ble derfor vedtatt som skulle styrke de lokale stammeledernes evne til selvstyre i sitt 
område, kun overvåket av de sentrale styresmaktene.  
 
Indirekte styre ble i første omgang innført blant nomadestammer i Kordofan og Darfur 
som i stor grad hadde bevart sin opprinnelige stammestruktur. En av disse stammene var 
Humr-stammen som levde i det sørvestlige hjørnet av Kordofan-provinsen av Sudan og 
livnærte seg gjennom kvegdrift. Stammen var bygd opp av flere mindre segmenter basert 
på lineært slektskap på farssiden, og denne strukturene ble integrert i 
lokaladministrasjonen. De av stammesjeikene som vise seg samarbeidsvillige ovenfor det 
britiske sentralstyret ble utnevnt til ledere innen stammen og ble gitt titlene Nazir og 
Omda.  
 
Er det mulig å spore noen sosiopolitiske endringer innen Humr-stammen som følge av 
britenes omlegging til indirekte styre? En agnatisk-segmentær modell, en patron-klient 
modell og en elitistisk modell har tidligere blitt tatt i bruk for å analysere ulike 
stammesamfunn i Kordofan. Gjennom mine studier av Humr-stammen har jeg kommet 
frem til at det er nyttig å se den i lys av en patron-klient modell, siden lederskapet innen 
stammen stor grad ble preget av deres klientistiske forhold til britene. Denne modellen 
kan imidlertid ikke benyttes for å forstå stammesamfunnet på lavere nivå siden patron-
klient båndene ble svakere lenger ned i administrasjonen. Tilhørighet og politisk makt var 
85 
 
på dette nivået fremdeles i stor grad basert på slektskap, og det blir derfor feilaktig å 
forkaste bruken den agnatisk-segmentære analysemodellen for å forstå Humr-stammens 
sosiopolitiske dynamikk. Innføringen av indirekte styre kan i lys av disse modellene sies 
å ha endret de sosiopolitiske strukturene på øverste nivå ved å konsolidere makten og 
gjøre stammesegmentene mer statiske, men i liten grad påvirket stammesamfunnet innen 
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